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  INTRODUCTION   
With the 2016 election of President Trump, the fate of the 
fledgling Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or the 
Bureau) hung in the balance. Would the Bureau be dismantled? 
Would it be reduced to an empty shell? 
These concerns were far from hypothetical. From the day it 
opened its doors, the Bureau was a lightning rod, sparking par-
tisan and industry opposition.1 The opposition mounted while 
the Bureau amassed an impressive track record in its first six-
 
 1. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: 
An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 336–38 (2013). 
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plus years.2 Under the CFPB’s first Director, Richard Cordray, 
the Bureau rolled out major rulemakings, built an examination 
force from scratch, unveiled the most effective consumer com-
plaint function in federal bank regulation history, and secured 
almost $12 billion dollars in financial relief for consumers.3 Par-
tisan and industry resentment smoldered as the Bureau racked 
up success after success. By the time that Mr. Cordray stepped 
down as Director in November 2017 to run for governor of Ohio, 
a backlash was in full force.  
Once the Trump Administration took power, the new lead-
ership and industry declared outright war on the Bureau. The 
assault came from all sides: from the Republican-controlled Con-
gress, from the new Administration, and from the courts.4 Inter-
estingly, the target was not so much the substance of federal con-
sumer financial laws as the structure of the CFPB itself. The 
attack on structure was based on the premise that the CFPB’s 
effectiveness was largely a product of its structure and that un-
dermining that structure was essential to neutering the Bureau.  
The CFPB’s architecture was not an accident. In 2010, when 
Congress originally created the CFPB in the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act5 (the Dodd-Frank 
Act or Dodd-Frank), it gave careful thought to the structure of 
consumer financial protection regulation. Congress focused on 
structure both to strengthen consumer financial protection and 
to shield federal oversight of consumer finance from interference 
for short-term political gain.6  
In view of that design, it was no wonder that seven years 
later, round one of the war against the CFPB aimed to bring 
down the structure of the Bureau in Congress and the courts. 
The congressional and judicial attacks focused on hot-button 
 
 2. Id. at 332 (discussing how prior to the creation of the Bureau the agen-
cies responsible for consumer financial protection lacked important information 
to do the job well). 
 3. See Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, Prepared Remarks at National Com-
munity Reinvestment Coalition Conference (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-cfpb-director 
-richard-cordray-national-community-reinvestment-coalition-conference. 
 4. See infra Parts II and III. 
 5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 6. See Leonard Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the 21st Century, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1146–49 (2012) (describing the powers Congress be-
stowed on the CFPB). 
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structural issues such the CFPB’s single-Director model, the Di-
rector’s protection from at-will firing, and the independent fund-
ing of the Bureau. Congress failed to enact legislation eliminat-
ing these structural protections, however, and internal divisions 
beset the judicial challenges’ litigation strategy. Frustrated in 
Congress and bogged down in the courts, the Republican leader-
ship turned to the White House to disable the CFPB from 
within.7 
Once President Trump appointed Mick Mulvaney, the Di-
rector of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as Acting 
Director of the CFPB in November 2017, the attack on the Bu-
reau’s structure entered a new and insidious phase. In round 
two, the guns were trained on the operational pillars of the Bu-
reau: rulemaking, supervision, enforcement, and some of their 
more controversial moving parts. This second, ongoing phase 
was waged principally by the CFPB’s new leadership and had all 
the marks of an inside job. 
Part I describes the numerous ways Congress consciously 
structured the operating divisions of the CFPB to strengthen 
consumer protection and avoid agency capture. These design 
choices were an intentional attempt to address the failures of 
federal regulation of consumer finance leading up to 2008.8 Part 
II turns to how the Trump Administration and other CFPB op-
ponents sought to paralyze the Bureau by compromising its 
structure through congressional and judicial action. After those 
efforts failed to gain traction, the CFPB’s opponents looked to 
the White House to dismantle the CFPB from inside.9 Part III 
proceeds to analyze Mr. Mulvaney’s efforts, as Acting CFPB Di-
rector, to immobilize the Bureau through administrative action. 
The events to date raise the ultimate question, will the as-
sault on the CFPB’s structure succeed? Or will the foundations 
of the Bureau emerge intact? Part IV takes up this question, 
evaluating the likely success of the Administration’s efforts to 
cripple the Bureau. In the short term, I conclude supervision and 
enforcement will slow down substantially and will be suspended 
for specific consumer laws and industry sectors. Reversing 
Cordray-era rules will be harder and take longer, but that pro-
cess has begun.  
 
 7. See infra Part II.C. 
 8. See Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1146–49 (explaining 
that the CFPB was created in response to the 2008 financial crisis and how it 
was designed to address the regulatory failures that culminated in that crisis). 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
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As a result, the CFPB’s rollback of compliance oversight will 
inflict substantial harm on consumers in the immediate and 
near term. Some of that short-term harm will be mitigated 
through concurrent state legislation and through oversight and 
enforcement by other state and federal regulators. Meanwhile, 
in the longer term, there are reasons to believe that the CFPB 
and its structure will ultimately survive. Because the current 
leadership’s actions are executive in nature, they are reversible 
(some requiring more effort than others) once a Director who 
genuinely cares for the welfare of consumers takes office. Any 
statutory repeals would have been harder to reverse, but the Re-
publican leadership was not able to enact legislation to abolish 
the Bureau or overhaul its structure even when it controlled both 
houses of Congress and the White House. As a result of congres-
sional gridlock, the Bureau’s governance and funding structure 
remain intact, the Bureau retains all of its core powers, and the 
federal consumer financial laws remain on the books.10 Thus, the 
Bureau will likely withstand the assault on its structure and 
survive until more favorable political winds prevail.  
This analysis depends on three assumptions, any of which if 
wrong could deal a lasting blow to consumer welfare. First, it 
assumes that none of the constitutional challenges to the CFPB’s 
structure now pending in federal court will succeed and abridge 
the Bureau’s independence. Second, it assumes that CFPB mort-
gage oversight will remain sufficiently robust to avoid another 
financial crisis. Lastly, as Part V describes, it assumes that citi-
zens and courts will rebuff attempts by the current CFPB lead-
ership to undermine the Bureau’s structure through disregard of 
law. A number of disturbing recent actions by leadership at the 
Bureau have flouted the spirit or letter of the law. If the laws 
creating the CFPB’s structure are treated with contempt, then 
all bets are off and the Bureau’s structure will be in serious peril.  
I.  THE ARCHITECTURE OF CFPB EFFECTIVENESS   
When Congress created the CFPB, the drafters of the Dodd-
Frank Act paid close attention to the architecture of consumer 
financial protection.11 That structure reflects a conscious deci-
sion to correct the regulatory failings of the past and to buffer 
CFPB decision-making against industry pressure and partisan 
meddling for campaign contributions and short-term advantage. 
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1145–49 (discussing 
Congress’s design of the CFPB). 
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Some of the ensuing design features are innovative, while 
others seem unremarkable. In the latter vein, for instance, Con-
gress deliberately clothed the CFPB with the traditional main-
stays of agency independence that all other federal banking reg-
ulators enjoy. These include statutory designation as an 
independent agency,12 funding outside the congressional appro-
priations process,13 protection of the agency head from at-will 
firing,14 a more competitive pay scale,15 and exemption from 
OMB cost-benefit review.16 Another, more novel, move was Con-
gress’s decision to embrace a new regulatory paradigm that di-
vides financial regulation according to risk and houses market 
conduct regulation in its own dedicated agency. 
A. A NEW REGULATORY MODEL 
Congress’s choice to assign consumer financial protection to 
a brand-new agency was a bold departure from the prior division 
of federal authority pre-crisis. Before 2008, chief rulemaking au-
thority for most federal consumer financial laws had resided in 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Federal 
jurisdiction over depository institutions and their nonbank lend-
ing affiliates for consumer compliance examinations and en-
forcement had been assigned to the relevant federal prudential 
banking regulator.17 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had 
regulated independent nonbank lenders, but it lacked significant 
examination powers18 and its rulemaking powers were paltry 
 
 12. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012). 
 13. Id. § 5497(a)(2)(C). Specifically, the Bureau’s budget is primarily 
funded by transfers from the Federal Reserve, capped at twelve percent of the 
Fed’s 2009 annual operating expenses, adjusted for inflation. Id. § 5497(a) 
(1)–(a)(2). 
 14. The President may only “remove the Director for inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or malfeasance in office.” Id. § 5491(c)(1)–(c)(3). 
 15. Id. §§ 5493(a)(2), 5941(b)(4). 
 16. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(A). 
 17. For a description of the division of regulatory authority before 2011, see 
Patricia A. McCoy & Elizabeth Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime 
and Nontraditional Home Mortgages, in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER AND 
MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 110, 127–28 tbl.4-1 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric 
S. Belsky eds., 2008). These regulators were the OCC for national banks and 
their operating subsidiaries, the Federal Reserve for state member banks and 
nonbank lending subsidiaries of bank holding companies, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for state non-member banks and their operating 
subsidiaries, and the former OTS for savings associations and their operating 
subsidiaries. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42572, THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS 3 
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compared to those of the Federal Reserve and the other federal 
prudential banking regulators.19 
Pre-crisis, a mortgage lender’s charter and sometimes the 
location of its operations dictated which consumer laws applied 
to the company. State-chartered depository institutions and in-
dependent nonbank lenders were subject to state anti-predatory 
lending laws in the states where they operated.20 Broad Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and Office of Thrift Su-
pervision (OTS) preemption rulings, meanwhile, freed national 
banks, federal savings associations, and their mortgage lending 
subsidiaries from compliance with those state mortgage lending 
laws. That left a void in consumer protection at federally char-
tered institutions, because the OCC and OTS did not replace the 
state strictures with tough anti-predatory lending provisions of 
their own.21  
This dual regulatory system allowed mortgage lenders to 
switch their charters in order to shop for the easiest regulator. 
Mortgage lenders could elect to organize as depository institu-
tions or nonbanks.22 Meanwhile, depository institutions could 
choose between state and federal charters and between thrift 
charters and commercial bank charters. To bypass a strict state 
law, a lender could convert to a federal bank or thrift charter or 
move its operations to a less regulated state. To shed a strong 
regulator, a lender could convert its charter and move to a more 
sympathetic agency. As their regulated entities threatened to 
bolt, regulators—both state and federal—came under mounting 
pressure to relax their mortgage lending standards and enforce-
ment. The result was a disastrous race to the bottom in mortgage 
lending. 
Congress could have tinkered at the margins by leaving reg-
ulators’ jurisdictional boundaries alone. In the mortgage lending 
area, however, the regulatory lapses had been so egregious that 
Congress devised a whole new model of regulation in the Dodd-
 
(2014).  
 19. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Essay, It’s Time to Remove the “Mossified” Pro-
cedures for FTC Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1979 (2015); McCoy & 
Renuart, supra note 17, at 123 n.47. 
 20. For full treatment of the regulatory race to the bottom in mortgage lend-
ing standards, see KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME 
VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 151–223 
(2011). 
 21. See id. at 157–62. 
 22. See McCoy & Renuart, supra note 17, at 128–30. 
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Frank Act.23 Under this structure, which had attributes of the 
“twin peaks” model,24 Congress lodged lead responsibility for two 
distinct risks—solvency risk and market conduct risk—in sepa-
rate agencies. It continued to vest authority for the solvency risk 
of banks and thrifts in the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the 
OCC. But it stripped the Federal Reserve of primary authority 
for overseeing market conduct risk in consumer finance and 
transferred that jurisdiction to the new CFPB. Further, Con-
gress made consumer financial protection the new Bureau’s sole 
mission, to ensure that the agency’s top priority was safeguard-
ing the financial health of consumers.25 Creating the Bureau also 
allowed Congress to write on a clean slate, with an agency that 
had not been captured.  
To be sure, the federal prudential banking regulators retain 
limited authority over consumer financial protection under 
Dodd-Frank. The Federal Reserve, the OCC, the FDIC, and the 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) conduct con-
sumer compliance examinations and enforcement for smaller de-
pository institutions and credit unions (with total assets of $10 
billion or less).26 Still, the breadth of the CFPB’s jurisdiction and 
its resulting expertise make it the predominant regulator in the 
field. The CFPB takes lead supervision and enforcement respon-
sibility for nonbanks,27 plus for the largest banks, thrifts, and 
 
 23. See Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1144, 1147–49 (de-
scribing how, in response to the mortgage crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-
Frank Act’s provisions on the CFPB to protect consumers in the financial mar-
ketplace). 
 24. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. INNOVA-
TION, TWIN PEAKS: A REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR THE NEW CENTURY (1995); 
see also Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 441, 460–61, 484–85 (1998) (describing regulation by risk). Technically, 
Congress adopted elements of a “triple peaks” model, because it housed respon-
sibility for a third financial risk—systemic risk—in the newly formed Financial 
Stability Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research. Dodd-Frank 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 111–156, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392–1420 (2010); MI-
CHAEL BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 79 (2d ed. 2018).  
 25. This decision was a reaction to the fact that the Federal Reserve suf-
fered from a serious mission conflict and a hostile mindset to market conduct 
regulation during the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. Not only was 
monetary policy its top priority, it viewed consumer financial protection as an-
tithetical to the short-term profitability of banks. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 
1, at 330–31. See generally ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 189–204. To 
compound matters, the Federal Reserve under then-Chairman Alan Greenspan 
was the most articulate proponent of the deregulatory agenda that prevailed 
during the 1990s and 2000s. See id. at 189–93. 
 26. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515–5516 (2012). 
 27. The CFPB has supervisory and enforcement powers over all nonbanks 
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credit unions (with more than $10 billion in total assets) and 
their affiliates.28 Most importantly, the Bureau has sole rule-
making authority for the federal consumer financial laws.29 
Those rules apply to depository institutions and nonbank provid-
ers alike. 
This structure allocating regulatory responsibilities accord-
ing to risk offers several benefits. It entrusts the Bureau with 
market conduct oversight and aligns the agency’s authority with 
its mission. It consolidates research and regulatory expertise for 
consumer finance in one agency. It enables the CFPB to better 
respond to new market conduct risks as financial products 
evolve. Finally, it blocks some of the most important previous 
avenues for regulatory arbitrage. 
B. REDUCED REGULATORY ARBITRAGE 
Several features of the CFPB’s architecture work to reduce 
regulatory arbitrage by industry participants. These elements 
include the new division of federal supervisory and enforcement 
authority for consumer finance, stricter, uniform federal sub-
stantive laws, agency disincentives to vie for more regulated en-
tities, and increased flexibility to keep abreast of financial inno-
vations. As a result, now it is harder for consumer financial 
 
that are either covered persons or services providers or that are governed by an 
enumerated consumer law. Id. §§ 5481(14), 5514(c)(3)(A). After it opened for 
business, the Bureau entered into a cooperation agreement with the FTC to 
share enforcement duties with respect to nonbanks. Id. § 5514(c)(3)(A); Memo-
randum of Understanding Between the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
and the Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter CFPB-FTC 
Memorandum of Understanding], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/120123ftc 
-cfpb-mou.pdf. 
The CFPB’s supervisory powers over nonbanks are somewhat narrower 
than its enforcement powers and depend on the industry. The CFPB examines 
all nonbank consumer financial services providers that: (1) offer or provide res-
idential mortgage loan origination, brokerage, or servicing; (2) offer loan modi-
fication or foreclosure relief services; (3) are payday lenders; or (4) are private 
student lenders. 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1). Nonbanks that provide other consumer 
financial products or services undergo CFPB supervision only if they are larger 
participants in their markets. Id. § 5514(a)(1)(B). For any given market, the 
CFPB defines “larger participant[s]” by rule after consultation with the FTC. 
Id. To date, the Bureau has defined that term for the debt collection and con-
sumer reporting industries, but has not yet defined it for the prepaid account, 
installment loan, vehicle title lending, or financial data aggregator markets. 12 
C.F.R. §§ 1090.104(b), 1090.105(b) (2018); see AM. FOR FIN. REFORM ET AL., No. 
2018-BCFP-004, COMMENTS & REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (“RFI”) REGARDING 
THE BUREAU’S SUPERVISION PROGRAM 1 (2018).  
 28. 12 U.S.C. § 5515. 
 29. Id. § 5512(b)(4)(A). 
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services providers to evade consumer regulation through new 
product lines or divide-and-conquer tactics. 
1. The Extension of the Supervisory Perimeter to Nonbanks 
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress reallocated federal author-
ity for supervision and enforcement to make it harder for non-
bank consumer finance companies to escape federal oversight. 
At the time of Dodd-Frank’s passage, insured depository institu-
tions and credit unions already underwent regular consumer 
compliance examinations. Consequently, Dodd-Frank’s biggest 
single change to the old supervisory regime was to extend federal 
supervision to independent nonbank providers and to assign 
that responsibility to the CFPB.30 
As a result, nonbanks under CFPB supervision31 no longer 
have the ability to flee federal oversight. If they retain their non-
bank charters, they remain under CFPB supervision and en-
forcement.32 If they convert to bank or thrift charters, they may 
escape CFPB supervision (depending on their size) but then will 
be overseen by one of the federal prudential banking regula-
tors.33 Further, the charter switch scenario is mostly hypothet-
ical for now, in part because bank regulators have granted ex-
tremely few charters post-crisis and applicants must raise 
substantial capital to win approval.34 Accordingly, nonbanks un-
der CFPB supervision cannot escape federal examination and 
have few easy alternatives for switching federal regulators.35 
 
 30. Id. §§ 5481(14), 5514(c)(3)(A). 
 31. Some nonbank financial providers remain exempt from CFPB supervi-
sion. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 32. 12 U.S.C. § 5514. 
 33. Id. §§ 5515–5516. 
 34. James M. Kane et al., Phoenix Rising: De Novo Bank Formation?, VED-
DER PRICE (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.vedderbanking.com/2018/03/update 
-de-novo-bank-formation-2015-2018. However, in 2018, the OCC announced it 
would start accepting applications for a new national fintech charter. Press Re-
lease, OCC, OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications From 
Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/news 
-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html. 
A separate reason why some nonbanks might not contemplate converting 
into bank charters is that the depository institution business model does not 
easily fit certain classes of nonbank providers, such as payday lenders, credit 
reporting agencies, and debt collectors. 
 35. In addition, Dodd-Frank’s provision transferring examination and en-
forcement authority over insured depository institutions and credit unions with 
total assets exceeding $10 billion and their affiliates to the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5515, curbed regulatory arbitrage in another way. Today, the only way for 
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2. Uniform Federal Standards 
Another way Dodd-Frank curbed regulatory arbitrage was 
by circumscribing firms’ ability to shop for the weakest consumer 
protection laws.36 Some history is needed to set the stage. Before 
the 2008 crisis, financial innovations had outpaced regulation, 
rendering the federal consumer financial laws obsolete. With 
rare exceptions,37 the federal laws on point had been confined to 
disclosure requirements. The old federal disclosures, however, 
brushed over the greatest financial risks that new financial 
products posed to consumers.38 Further, millions of consumers 
were unable to grasp those disclosures or use them properly due 
to lack of financial literacy, cognitive impairments, behavioral 
biases, or victimization through fraud.39 
At the state level, by 2007, twenty-nine states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia40 had adopted new, stricter mortgage lending 
laws that went well beyond disclosures by actually outlawing or 
restricting certain mortgage terms and practices.41 Federal law 
at that time offered no equivalent protections, except for the re-
strictions on high-cost mortgages in the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA),42 which were limited to the cost-
liest one percent of mortgage refinance loans.43 Worse, the legal 
void created by the OCC and OTS preemption rulings encour-
aged mortgage lenders to flock to the lax federal charters in 
droves. 
 
large depository institutions to shed the Bureau as their supervisor is to down-
size below the $10 billion threshold. Only a few institutions on the cusp of the 
$10 billion cutoff can do this as a practical manner.  
 36. See also supra Part I.B.1. 
 37. Examples include the old restrictions on high-cost loans, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1602(aa) (West 2018), contained in the Home Ownership and Equity Protec-
tion Act amendments to Truth in Lending Act, as codified in 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1639(c)–(m) (West 2018), and the anti-kickback provisions in the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2012). 
 38. See Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based 
Pricing, 44 HARV. J. LEGIS. 123 (2007). 
 39. See, e.g., McCoy & Renuart, supra note 17, at 125–27 (discussing com-
plexities in grasping adjustable-rate mortgages). 
 40. Id. at 119–20. 
 41. Raphael Bostic, Kathleen C. Engel, Patricia A. McCoy, Anthony Pen-
nington-Cross & Susan Wachter, State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: 
The Effect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 47, 52–54 
(2008); McCoy & Renuart, supra note 17, at 119. 
 42. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, §§ 151–158, 108 Stat. 2160 (codified as amended in 
in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1602, 1639–1641). 
 43. McCoy & Renuart, supra note 17, at 119, 123 n.47. 
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The Dodd-Frank Act plugged that hole in four ways. First, 
Congress took a leaf from the state anti-predatory lending laws 
and strengthened the federal consumer financial laws consider-
ably by outlawing or regulating a long list of hazardous mortgage 
lending terms and practices.44 Second, Congress gave the CFPB 
sole rulemaking authority for these (and other) federal consumer 
financial laws.45 Third, virtually all consumer financial services 
providers across the country must observe those stricter federal 
laws, regardless of charter or location. As a result, companies 
can no longer duck those laws by changing regulators or locales. 
Fourth, the stricter federal consumer financial laws blunt OCC 
preemption for federally chartered depository institutions under 
the National Bank Act46 and the Home Owners’ Loan Act47 by 
substituting comparable federal rules for many of the preempted 
state laws.48 Unlike with state regulatory regimes, national 
banks and federal thrifts cannot effectively opt out of these de-
manding federal laws. In the meantime, all other consumer fi-
nancial services providers, regardless of their charter or location, 
are subject to those same, stronger federal laws. 
3. Other Disincentives to Charter Competition 
During the lead-up to 2008, financial regulators had their 
own perverse incentives to vie for charters, meaning that the 
regulatory race to the bottom during those years was a two-way 
street. Financial services providers switched to lighter regula-
tors, while agencies loosened regulation to woo firms to their 
fold. To prevent a recurrence, Congress instituted reforms to dis-
courage the CFPB from courting new regulated entities by relax-
ing oversight. 
One way Congress achieved this was by drawing bright-line 
borders around the CFPB’s jurisdiction that the agency cannot 
easily enlarge. Thus, banks, thrifts, and credit unions with more 
 
 44. See 12 U.S.C. § 5532(f )  (2012) (integrated mortgage disclosures); 15 
U.S.C. § 1639 (2012), amended by Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296, 1305 (2018) 
(high-cost mortgages); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639b(c)(3) (anti-steering provisions), 
1639c(b)(3) (ability-to-repay and qualified mortgage rule), 1639d (escrow re-
quirements). 
 45. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481(14), 5512(a), 5512(b)(4)(A). 
 46. National Bank Act, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C). 
 47. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461–1470. 
 48. In addition, OCC preemption no longer applies to nonbank operating 
subsidiaries of national banks or federal savings associations. 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 25B(e), 1465(a). 
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than $10 billion in total assets and their affiliates are subject to 
CFPB supervision and enforcement, while smaller depository in-
stitutions are not.49 All nonbank mortgage lenders, mortgage 
servicers, mortgage brokers, foreclosure relief firms, payday 
lenders, and private student lenders are similarly subject to 
CFPB oversight.50 Other nonbank providers only face CFPB su-
pervision if they are “larger participants,” but the Bureau will 
face industry resistance if it seeks to define that term for addi-
tional industry sectors such as installment lenders.51 Accord-
ingly, the CFPB cannot easily expand its turf by loosening regu-
lation. 
Furthermore, the CFPB lacks a financial incentive to vie for 
regulated entities. Unlike the OCC and the former OTS, the Bu-
reau does not depend on assessments on its regulated companies 
to fund its operations. Instead, the CFPB is housed within,52 and 
derives almost all of its funding from,53 the Federal Reserve. 
This independent funding model, combined with the bright-line 
nature of the Bureau’s jurisdiction over entities, eliminates a 
chief reason for the destructive charter competition that precip-
itated the 2008 crisis. 
4. Greater Ability to Reach Harmful Conduct 
So far, this discussion has focused on regulatory arbitrage 
through charter shopping. Other forms of regulatory arbitrage, 
however, involve harmful conduct that is calibrated to evade reg-
ulation. For example, a provider might engage in misconduct 
harming consumers that has not yet been condemned as illegal. 
Or a provider might devise a risky new product that has not yet 
been regulated. In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress carefully con-
sidered how to reduce both types of arbitrage when it designed 
the powers it conferred on the CFPB. 
a. Conduct That Evades Bright-Line Rules 
In 2010, if Congress had merely used rules to define specific 
conduct as consumer abuses and banned them ex ante, fraud-
sters would have had rein to devise new forms of fraud or other 
 
 49. Id. §§ 5515–5516 
 50. Id. § 5514. 
 51. See supra note 27. 
 52. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a); see Levitin, supra note 1, at 339–40. 
 53. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1)–(2). For a description of that funding, see supra 
note 13. 
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misconduct that had not yet been declared illegal.54 To avoid this 
type of arbitrage, Congress took care not to confine CFPB regu-
lation to narrowly defined types of market misconduct in the 
Dodd-Frank Act.55 Instead, Congress also conferred a standard56 
giving the CFPB the power to prohibit unfair, deceptive or abu-
sive acts or practices (UDAAPs) in connection with the offering 
of, or transactions with consumers in, consumer financial prod-
ucts or services.57 This power builds on the FTC’s traditional 
statutory power to punish unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
(UDAPs),58 but expands that power by adding the term “abu-
sive.” 
In Dodd-Frank, Congress empowered the CFPB to address 
UDAAPs in two ways. The Bureau may promulgate rules out-
lawing specific conduct as UDAAPs.59 And in addition, it can 
 
 54. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 84–85 (2008). 
 55. As this implies, Congress in Dodd-Frank did outlaw an extensive set of 
specific market abuses in the federal consumer financial laws. See, e.g., 12 
U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting covered persons or service providers from 
offering or providing “to a consumer any financial product or service not in con-
formity with Federal consumer financial law, or otherwise commit any act or 
omission in violation of a Federal consumer financial law”). In that connection, 
the Bureau has the power to prescribe rules “to administer and carry out the 
purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent 
evasions thereof.” Id. § 5512(b)(1). 
 56. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992), for discussion of the difference between rules and 
standards. Cf. Prentiss Cox et al., Strategies of Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 37, 44–45 (2018) (explaining how analogous laws against unfair 
and deceptive acts and practices operate as standards). 
 57. 12 U.S.C. § 5531; see also id. § 5536(a)(1)(B) (making it unlawful for 
covered persons or service providers to engage in UDAAPs). The Dodd-Frank 
Act defines the terms “unfair” and “abusive,” but not the term “deceptive” 
(which has been well developed through longstanding FTC case law). Id. 
§ 5531(c)–(d).  
Less well-known, but similarly broad, is the Bureau’s power to define other 
practices, by regulation, as consumer financial products or services where those 
services are “permissible for a bank or for a financial holding company to offer 
or to provide under any provision of a Federal law or regulation applicable to a 
bank or a financial holding company, and has, or likely will have a material 
impact on consumers.” Id. § 5481(15)(A)(xi)(II). This power, however, is confined 
to financial products or services offered or provided by banks or financial hold-
ing companies and does not extend to services offered or provided by independ-
ent nonbank providers. 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
 59. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b); see also id. § 5538(a)(1) (authorizing the Bureau to 
prescribe rules on UDAPs in mortgage loans, including loan modification and 
foreclosure rescue services). The agency is required to consult the federal bank-
ing agencies, or other agencies, as appropriate, concerning the consistency of 
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take enforcement action to prevent UDAAPs by covered persons 
or service providers.60 This latter power allows the Bureau to 
seek redress against new types of consumer harms, even if the 
agency had not defined those harms as UDAAPs by regulation 
before.61 This enforcement power against UDAAPs has proven 
crucial in combatting regulatory arbitrage, with illegal deceptive 
acts or practices accounting for approximately 60 percent of the 
Bureau’s enforcement orders through year-end 2015.62 
b. Product Innovation to Evade Regulation 
Product innovations are another time-tested technique for 
evading regulation.63 Several aspects of Dodd-Frank’s consumer 
financial protection scheme seek to blunt this type of arbitrage 
by enhancing the Bureau’s ability to keep up with financial in-
novations that are marketed to consumers. Among these aspects, 
the most important is the shift to regulation by risk, which al-
lows the CFPB to regulate market conduct risks in all consumer 
finance products or services, new or old.64 
 
any such proposed rule with prudential, market, or systemic objectives admin-
istered by such agencies. Id. § 5531(e). 
 60. Id. § 5531(a); see also id. § 5538(a) (authorizing the Bureau and the FTC 
to enforce any specialized UDAP rules applying to mortgages). Dodd-Frank de-
fines a “covered person” as “any person that engages in offering or providing a 
consumer financial product or service.” Id. § 5481(6). In addition, the term “cov-
ered person” extends to any affiliate of a covered person that acts as a service 
provider to that person. Id. § 5481(6)(B). Subject to certain exceptions, the term 
“service provider” means “any person that provides a material service to a cov-
ered person in connection with the offering or provision by such covered person 
of a consumer financial product or service . . .” Id. § 5481(26)(A). This includes 
persons who participate in “designing, operating, or maintaining,” or who pro-
cess transactions relating to, the product or service. Id. 
 61. This uncertainty drew the ire of the Chamber of Commerce. See CTR. 
FOR CAPITAL MKTS., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PRO-
TECTION BUREAU: WORKING TOWARDS FUNDAMENTAL REFORM 4–5, 11, 14–15 
(2018) [hereinafter CHAMBER OF COMMERCE], https://www.centerforcapital 
markets.com/resource/working-towards-fundamental-reform. 
 62. See Christopher L. Peterson, Comments of Financial Regulation and 
Consumer Protection Scholars and Former Regulators on Docket No. CFPB-
2018-0003, at 7 (May 14, 2018) [hereinafter May 14, 2018 Comments], https:// 
lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cfpb-comments/3. 
 63. For an example of how payday lenders evaded a New Mexico payday 
regulation law by reinventing their product, see Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Inter-
est—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solu-
tions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 585–96 (2010). 
 64. This is encompassed by Dodd-Frank’s broad command to the Bureau to 
“implement and . . . enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for the 
purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer 
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The Bureau also has improved ability to oversee product in-
novations based on its mandate to “regulate the offering and pro-
vision of consumer financial products or services under the Fed-
eral consumer financial laws.”65 Dodd-Frank defined the 
operative term—“consumer financial products or services”—to 
include a long list of financial services to consumers made for 
personal, family or household purposes.66 This list includes the 
functional equivalents of numerous traditional services.67 In ad-
dition, Congress added a catch-all definition of that term that 
includes other financial products or services that are specifically 
conducted for purposes of regulatory arbitrage:68 
(xi) such other financial product or service as may be defined by the 
Bureau, by regulation, for purposes of this title, if the Bureau finds that 
such financial product or service is— 
(I) Entered into or conducted as a subterfuge or with a purpose to 
evade any Federal consumer financial law; . . . 
This clause, combined with the functional equivalent clause, al-
lows the CFPB to oversee all sorts of novel consumer financial 
services. 
Finally, as I discuss in greater detail below, Congress pre-
served the states’ ability to adopt state laws and rules on con-
sumer financial protection that are stronger than their federal 
counterparts, so long as the state laws and rules are consistent 
with federal law.69 States are more attuned to local conditions 
and are often better positioned to detect and respond to new, 
emerging types of consumer harms than the CFPB located in 
Washington, D.C. This expansion of the states’ ability to redress 
market misconduct is another Dodd-Frank response to the po-
tential risks posed by financial innovations. 
*** 
 
financial products and services and that markets for consumer financial prod-
ucts and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.” 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a). 
 65. Id. § 5491(a). 
 66. Id. § 5481(5). 
 67. Specifically, consumer financial products or services include extensions 
of credit and leases that are functional equivalents of purchase finance, real 
estate settlement services, deposit-taking, money transmission or exchange, 
stored value and payment instruments, check cashing and other checking ser-
vices, payments services, credit counseling, debt settlement, and certain other 
financial advisory services, consumer reporting, and debt collection. Id. 
§ 5481(5), (15)(A). The term “financial product or service” excludes the business 
of insurance and electronic conduit services, however. Id. § 5481(15)(C). 
 68. Id. § 5481(15)(A)(xi)(I); see also id. § 5512(b)(1). 
 69. Id. § 5551(a) (2012). For further discussion, see infra notes 102–04 and 
accompanying text. 
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Together, these design attributes in the Dodd-Frank Act 
made significant inroads on opportunities for regulatory arbi-
trage by regulated entities. Now it is difficult for consumer fi-
nancial services firms to escape federal market conduct over-
sight. Similarly, all financial providers operate under the same 
federal consumer financial protection laws nationwide. For its 
part, the CFPB lacks the financial incentives that tempted the 
OCC and the former OTS to let down their guard before 2008. 
Finally, the switch to regulation by risk, the introduction of 
UDAAP powers, and the renewed empowerment of state regula-
tion in Dodd-Frank substantially increases regulators’ ability to 
track and regulate any consumer harms from financial innova-
tions as they materialize. 
C. COMMITMENT TO EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION-MAKING 
Another core CFPB principle is its commitment to data-
driven regulation. From the day the CFPB had opened its doors, 
the agency prided itself on evidence-based decision-making.70 
This devotion to empirically-based policymaking is hard-wired 
into the structure of the Bureau and flows from Dodd-Frank’s 
command to “collect[], research[], monitor[], and publish[] in-
formation relevant to the functioning of” consumer financial 
markets in order to “identify risks to consumers and the proper 
functioning of such markets[.]”71  
In furtherance of that objective, Dodd-Frank expressly in-
structed the Director to establish a research function, which 
Congress charged with “researching, analyzing, and reporting” 
on consumer financial markets, market developments and their 
effects, and consumer behavior when using financial products.72 
The Bureau houses its research operations in its Regulations, 
Markets, and Research Division (RMR) within two types of 
teams. The research team, which is staffed with respected Ph.D. 
economists, behavioral scientists, and data analysts, conducts 
impartial, quantitative and qualitative research on topics in con-
sumer finance, including firm behavior, household decision-
making, and welfare-enhancing regulation, often using large, 
state-of-the-art data sets.73 Meanwhile, the markets teams in 
 
 70. See Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1155–58 (discussing 
the Bureau’s commitment to data-driven analysis). 
 71. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(3); see also id. § 5512(c) (mandating CFPB monitor-
ing for rulemaking purposes and otherwise). 
 72. Id. § 5493(b)(1). 
 73. See Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1155. 
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RMR monitor consumer financial markets and conduct evidence-
based policy analysis on markets including mortgages, credit 
cards, small dollar lending, student loans, deposits, debt collec-
tion, and credit reporting.74 
These teams work closely together and with other CFPB 
regulators in rulemaking, supervision and enforcement. Before 
virtually all major proposed rulemakings, for example, the Bu-
reau traditionally has conducted careful empirical analysis of 
consumer financial markets and their benefits and any harm to 
consumers.75 Importantly, where the Bureau’s rulemaking au-
thority is discretionary, the agency has not pre-judged the need 
for a rule. Instead, RMR conducted economic studies of the mar-
ket in question, following consultation with industry, academia, 
think tanks, consumer groups and others, to evaluate whether a 
rule should even be considered in light of the competing benefits 
and costs. If a discretionary rulemaking moved forward, the Bu-
reau ran more empirical analyses to pinpoint how the market 
failed and to evaluate competing approaches for how to fix it.76  
The Bureau does not limit its empirical analysis to rulemak-
ing activities. Supervision conducts voluminous empirical anal-
ysis to detect and understand trends in the field. Enforcement 
analyzes data to evaluate whether action should be taken and, if 
so, what type. 
As this suggests, data are the lifeblood of the Bureau’s mar-
kets analytics, research, and supervision activities. The Bureau 
draws on a broad range of quantitative and qualitative data to 
 
 74. See id. at 1156. Separately, the Bureau’s Academic Research Council, 
comprised of leading economists and other experts, advises RMR on research 
methodologies, data collection, and analytic design. CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 56 (2017) [hereinaf-
ter March 2017 Semi-Annual Report], https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data 
-research/research-reports/semi-annual-report-spring-2017; see also Academic 
Research Council, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/advisory 
-committees/academic-research-council (last visited Apr. 12, 2019) (for exam-
ples of the Council’s recommendations).  
 75. See Patricia A. McCoy, Fin. Regulation & Consumer Prot. Scholars & 
Former Regulators, Response Regarding Bureau Rulemaking Processes (Docket 
No. CFPB-2018-0009), at 11–13 (June 7, 2018) [hereinafter June 7 Comment], 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cfpb-comments/6. The ability-to-repay rule 
was a special case. Because the Bureau inherited that rulemaking from the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which had issued the pro-
posed rule, this initial research occurred both at the Bureau and at the Federal 
Reserve. 
 76. These analyses build on an existing foundation of the ongoing monitor-
ing of consumer financial markets for developments and any risks to consumers 
required by Section 1022(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c). 
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tackle analytical questions. The research economists and mar-
kets experts in RMR analyze large data sets,77 some assembled 
by the federal government78 and others purchased from private 
vendors. Their work is supplemented with qualitative analysis 
and field insights from CFPB examinations, consumer com-
plaints, public comments, and other sources,79 which are used, 
among other things, to spot emerging issues for further research. 
The breadth and depth of these data sources ensure that CFPB 
policymaking is evidence-based, and not ideologically driven. 
D. RULEMAKING POWERS 
As the discussion so far has hinted, the CFPB, like the fed-
eral prudential banking regulators, has broad rulemaking pow-
ers delegated to it by Congress.80 On its face, the power to pre-
scribe rules might seem unremarkable. In reality, Congress 
consciously designed the Bureau’s rulemaking powers to 
strengthen federal consumer protection oversight. 
As one important example, the CFPB’s rulemaking powers 
have the same safeguards against partisan interference as rule-
making by other federal banking regulators. Importantly, all 
federal banking regulators, including the Bureau, are free from 
the normal requirement that agencies submit their rules to 
OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for 
review and cost-benefit analysis.81 This results from the express 
exemption in Executive Order 12,866 for agencies designated as 
“independent regulatory agencies” under the Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act.82 The Paperwork Reduction Act’s list of independent 
 
 77. See CFPB, SOURCES AND USES OF DATA AT THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION 21–28 (2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
documents/6850/bcfp_sources-uses-of-data.pdf (describing data sources used by 
the CFPB). 
 78. Examples include the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act dataset and the 
National Mortgage Database. See HMDA & PMIC Data Products, FED. FIN. IN-
STITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL (Sept 6, 2018), https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/ 
hmdaproducts.htm; National Mortgage Database Program, FED. HOUSING FIN. 
AGENCY, https://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Programs/Pages/ 
National-Mortgage-Database.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
 79. See, e.g., March 2017 Semi-Annual Report, supra note 74, at 64; How 
We Use Complaint Data, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ 
data-use (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
 80. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (general rulemaking authority); id. 
§ 5518(b) (mandatory arbitration clauses); id. § 5531(b) (defining unfair, decep-
tive or abusive acts or practices); id. §§ 5532(a), 5533(a). 
 81. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,753 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 82. Id.  
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regulatory agencies includes the CFPB and all other federal 
banking regulators.83  
This exemption is significant because of OMB’s situs in the 
White House.84 Effectively, Executive Order 12,866 shields the 
CFPB from White House review of its rules. The purpose of this 
carve-out is to ensure the expert neutrality of CFPB rules and to 
insulate those rules from political manipulation by OMB and the 
White House. Instead, Congress, not the White House, retains 
ultimate control over CFPB rules. 
Congress also strengthened rulemaking for consumer finan-
cial protection by applying the Administrative Procedures Act 
(APA),85 including its notice and comment provisions and rights 
of judicial review, to all CFPB rulemakings. Insofar as the fed-
eral prudential banking regulators also conduct rulemakings un-
der the APA, this might sound mundane. However, when Con-
gress crafted the CFPB’s rulemaking powers, it did so cognizant 
of the substantially weaker rulemaking powers accorded to the 
FTC.86 In the 1975 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,87 Congress 
had hobbled the FTC’s ability to promulgate binding rules by im-
posing rigid rulemaking procedures on top of those already man-
dated by the APA.88 Thus, in all FTC rulemakings, the Commis-
sion must give “interested persons an opportunity for oral 
presentations of data, views, and arguments.”89 FTC rules are 
also subject to a much harsher standard of judicial review than 
standard APA rulemakings.90 These added procedures proved so 
 
 83. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012).  
 84. 31 U.S.C. § 501 (2012) (establishing OMB as “an office in the Executive 
Office of the President”). Because OMB resides within the White House, its web-
site is nested within the White House website. See OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, 
WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
 85. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5538(a)(1) (requiring CFPB rules on unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
mortgage loans to be adopted “in accordance with section 553 of title 5”); id. 
§ 5551(c)(5) (“No provision of this subsection shall be construed as exempting 
the Bureau from complying with” the rulemaking requirements of the APA). 
 86. The FTC was the primary federal market conduct regulator for non-
bank financial providers before the CFPB’s creation. Today, it shares enforce-
ment responsibilities for nonbanks with the Bureau. See CFPB-FTC Memoran-
dum of Understanding, supra note 27. 
 87. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 2309 (2012). 
 89. Id. § 2309(a). 
 90. See id. § 57a(e) (providing that “any interested person” may “file a peti-
tion” with the D.C. Circuit “for judicial review” of a rule within sixty days of the 
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cumbersome that after the enactment of Magnuson-Moss, the 
FTC adopted no significant rules governing nonbank providers91 
and relied strictly on enforcement actions. 
Congress took pains to avoid repeating that mistake in 
Dodd-Frank by conferring standard, more flexible APA rulemak-
ing powers on the CFPB and applying those rules to banks and 
nonbanks alike. The Bureau’s rulemaking authority is more 
workable than the FTC’s, allowing the CFPB to police the mar-
ketplace without relying on enforcement actions alone. This in-
ures to the benefit of both industry and consumers because rules, 
unlike enforcement, give regulated companies notice of the Bu-
reau’s expectations and ample opportunities for input through 
the public comment process. In addition, rules do not entail the 
moral approbation of enforcement actions. 
Another strong feature of CFPB rulemaking involves the 
regulatory toolbox at the agency’s disposal. In the Dodd-Frank 
Act, Congress significantly expanded and strengthened the 
types of regulatory techniques that the CFPB can draw on when 
engaging in rulemaking. As mentioned earlier, previously, with 
few exceptions,92 federal consumer financial protection rules had 
been limited to mandatory disclosures. In the Dodd-Frank Act, 
Congress revisited the federal government’s near-total reliance 
on consumer disclosures and found it wanting. Consequently, in 
addition to reforming the existing federal disclosure scheme, 
Congress gave the Bureau authority to mandate prohibitions or 
restrictions on some types of credit terms and practices93 and to 
offer legal incentives for other terms and practices that it wished 
to encourage.94 
In sum, Congress designed the rulemaking powers of the 
Bureau with an eye to their effectiveness. It removed CFPB rules 
from OIRA review, it rejected the rigid strictures that crippled 
FTC rulemakings, and it expanded the regulatory toolkit that 
the Bureau can draw on in rulemakings. These attributes had 
beneficial ripple effects not just for CFPB rulemaking, but also 
for supervision and enforcement by the Bureau, as I now discuss. 
 
rule being promulgated); id. § 2309(a). 
 91. See Lubbers, supra note 19. 
 92. See, e.g., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2607 
(2012); Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 
2190 (1994) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1602, 1639–41). 
 93. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a). 
 94. See, e.g., id. § 1639c(b). 
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E. THE CRUCIAL SYMBIOSIS OF RULEMAKING, SUPERVISION, 
AND ENFORCEMENT 
In many ways, Congress’s decision to confer the triad of rule-
making, supervision, and enforcement powers on the Bureau 
seems unremarkable. The other federal banking regulators have 
exercised those powers for years. From another perspective, 
however, the juxtaposition of all three powers within the Bureau 
considerably strengthened its capabilities compared to the FTC. 
On top of its ineffective rulemaking powers, the FTC’s ability to 
prevent market conduct abuses was (and is) hampered by its 
lack of power to examine nonbanks. Effectively, two of the three 
most powerful regulatory functions—APA rulemaking and su-
pervision—are missing from the FTC’s arsenal. 
This difference in the FTC and CFPB regulatory models 
highlights the crucial symbiosis among rulemaking, supervision, 
and enforcement. The first advantage of this symbiosis arises 
from the interaction between rulemaking and enforcement. 
Rules that lack enforcement are not worth the paper on which 
they are written. Similarly, enforcement benefits from the ex 
ante promulgation of rules. Rules are instrumental in defining 
prohibited conduct and in providing legal grounds for enforce-
ment as markets and consumer harms evolve. Further, the re-
search and markets analysis that underpins CFPB rules95 pro-
vides an important avenue for detecting potential enforcement 
problems and gauging their importance. 
Supervision and enforcement enjoy a similarly beneficial in-
teraction. The on-site examinations and off-site monitoring that 
CFPB supervision provides are invaluable in detecting viola-
tions.96 It also allows the Bureau to spot new efforts at regula-
tory arbitrage and to update its rules to prevent any new abuses 
that result. In contrast, the FTC cannot open an enforcement in-
vestigation as a practical matter until it receives outside notice 
of prohibited market conduct, either through a consumer com-
plaint, the press, a whistle-blower, a competitor, or some other 
external channel. The CFPB is in a better position than the FTC 
to actively root out problems because it has the independent au-
thority to go into companies and examine their practices directly. 
 
 95. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
 96. Cf. Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating 
Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 
92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (“Continuous monitoring—a hallmark of 
entity-based systemic risk oversight—allows FSOC members and Federal Re-
serve officials to observe the impact of different activities across time.”). 
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The importance of the symbiosis between supervision and 
enforcement is particularly evident when it comes to fair lending 
violations and student loans. Consumers who have been injured 
by lending discrimination are in a poor position to successfully 
obtain relief because they often lack the evidence to detect dis-
crimination, let alone plead a prima facie case. And, even if they 
did, the cost of private litigation too often is prohibitively expen-
sive.97 Similarly, the recent surge in total student loan indebted-
ness (today, that sector accounts for the second largest amount 
of aggregate consumer debt, behind home mortgages)98 and the 
shockingly high default rate on those loans99 make vigorous su-
pervision and enforcement essential. 
The CFPB located both of these functions inside its Division 
of Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending (SEFL) to max-
imize their effectiveness. In Dodd-Frank, Congress directed the 
Bureau to create an Office of Fair Lending and Equal Oppor-
tunity (OFLEO),100 and further created the position of the Pri-
vate Education Loan Ombudsman.101 By situating both offices 
right within SEFL, the CFPB leveraged the combined strengths 
of supervision and enforcement to detect and redress credit dis-
crimination and misconduct by private student lenders and their 
servicers. 
In sum, the decision to endow the CFPB with the three pil-
lars of rulemaking, supervision and enforcement vastly enriched 
its ability to define violations, to detect violations when they oc-
cur, and to initiate enforcement when consumers have suffered 
harm. This design substantially improves the Bureau’s ability to 
safeguard consumers compared to that of the FTC. 
F. DUAL FEDERAL-STATE PROTECTIONS AFFORD MULTIPLE 
CENTERS OF OVERSIGHT 
As a final structural element, when it drafted Dodd-Frank, 
Congress added prophylactic measures in case the CFPB suc-
cumbed to industry capture or had a Director who was hostile to 
consumer interests. These safeguards employ the diversity of 
 
 97. See, e.g., Winnie Taylor, Proving Racial Discrimination and Monitoring 
Fair Lending Compliance: The Missing Data Problem in Nonmortgage Credit, 
31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 199, 241–42 (2011). 
 98. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSE-
HOLD DEBT AND CREDIT 3 (Aug. 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2018Q2.pdf. 
 99. See, e.g., id. at 1. 
 100. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(c) (2012). 
 101. Id. § 5535. 
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governmental organs and officials at the state and federal lev-
els—each with different constituencies and incentives—as a 
springboard to protect consumers in the event the CFPB re-
treats. 
The first of these safeguards consists of the concurrent ap-
plicability of state and federal consumer financial laws. Under 
Dodd-Frank, state laws operate in tandem with the federal con-
sumer financial laws and accompanying CFPB rules. Specifi-
cally, Dodd-Frank provides that no federal consumer financial 
law or rule shall supplant state laws, unless a state law “is in-
consistent with the provisions of [Title X of Dodd-Frank], and 
then only to the extent of the inconsistency.”102 Further, state 
laws that afford greater protection to consumers than Title X of 
Dodd-Frank are not “inconsistent” per se.103 By virtue of this lat-
ter provision, federal law operates as a floor, not a ceiling. As a 
result, states can protect their citizens by adopting consumer fi-
nancial laws that exceed federal protections, so long as those 
state laws are consistent with federal law.104  
The second safeguard gives concurrent authority to the 
states to enforce federal consumer financial laws and CFPB reg-
ulations. In an unusual provision, Dodd-Frank authorized state 
attorneys general to sue to enforce the provisions of Title X of 
Dodd-Frank and CFPB rules issued under that title.105 The only 
exception is where the defendant is a federally chartered bank 
or savings association, in which case state attorneys general may 
only sue to enforce those CFPB rules.106 State regulators may 
also “bring a civil action or other appropriate proceeding” to en-
 
 102. Id. § 5551(a)(1). 
 103. Id. § 5551(a)(2). 
 104. See id. §§ 5551(a), 5552(d). However, federal preemption continues to 
operate in other, important respects in consumer finance. See BARR ET AL., su-
pra note 24, at 128–36, 618–24. 
 105. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1). Another provision of Dodd-Frank allows states, 
upon specified fact-findings by the state’s attorney general, to file suit in parens 
patrie to enforce any CFPB rules that define UDAPs “regarding mortgage 
loans.” Id. § 5538(a)(1), (b)(1). 
 106. Id. § 5552(a)(2). State attorneys general may also enforce specified pro-
visions of the Truth in Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2012); 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5552(a)(3). Separately, the Dodd-Frank Act clarified the visitorial standards 
for national banks and federal savings associations to allow any state attorney 
general “to bring an action against a national bank [or federal savings associa-
tion] in a court of appropriate jurisdiction to enforce an applicable law and to 
seek relief as authorized by such law.” 12 U.S.C. § 25B(i). 
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force the same federal laws and rules against state-chartered en-
tities.107 
Together, these Dodd-Frank provisions preserving state 
laws and conferring added state enforcement powers add an im-
portant element of redundancy to federal consumer financial 
protection. States can experiment with stronger consumer laws 
if they conclude that Congress or the CFPB have set the bar too 
low. And if CFPB enforcement falters, the states can step in and 
enforce certain federal consumer financial protection laws, plus 
their own laws (subject, of course, to the limitations of OCC 
preemption). Any enforcement action by the states, moreover, 
has the potential to shame the CFPB into more vigilant enforce-
ment action of its own. 
To conclude, Congress designed the CFPB’s structure and 
its interaction with strong consumer protection in mind. The 
structure tasks the Bureau with one mission, while the agency’s 
independent status is meant to shield it from political interfer-
ence. Similarly, numerous design features work to block or re-
duce arbitrage by the CFPB’s regulated entities. Finally, Con-
gress endowed the Bureau with a more effective set of regulatory 
powers—consisting of flexible rulemaking authority plus super-
vision and enforcement—than those accorded the FTC. So it is 
no wonder that when the backlash against the CFPB eventually 
materialized, it was aimed at the architecture of the Bureau. 
II.  THE CFPB’S STRUCTURE UNDER SIEGE   
With the advent of the Trump Administration, the CFPB’s 
opponents stepped up attacks on the agency in all three branches 
of the federal government. In 2017 and 2018, the Republican-
controlled Congress filed multiple bills to curtail the Bureau and 
its rules. Regulated firms went to court to challenge the CFPB’s 
constitutionality. Meanwhile, the Acting Director of the Bureau, 
Mick Mulvaney, instituted an array of actions directed at para-
lyzing the central nervous system of the Bureau. 
These campaigns, in all three branches, were noteworthy for 
their strategy. One might expect opponents to focus on abolish-
ing the Bureau outright or on overturning specific consumer fi-
nancial laws or rules. For the most part, that is not what hap-
pened. Apart from two important exceptions—the payday 
lending rule and the mandatory arbitration rule—opponents did 
not make serious attempts to overturn CFPB rules per se in 2017 
 
 107. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1). 
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and 2018. Similarly, the Republican leadership did not seek to 
abolish the Bureau outright. 
Instead, after the change in administrations, most attacks 
on the Bureau sought to undermine the structure of the Bureau. 
Some of these controversies over structure were veiled attacks 
on discrete substantive initiatives of the Bureau, most notably 
those involving fair lending and student debt.108 More often, the 
structural campaigns were aimed at slowing down the Bureau’s 
operations or disabling them.  
This structural strategy offered its proponents two main ad-
vantages. For starters, the strategy was technical in nature and 
thus less likely to turn into a public lightning rod than opposing 
popular substantive policies or abolishing the CFPB, a political 
third rail that most opponents avoided.109 Notably in that re-
gard, no serious attempt at abolition was mounted through 2018 
and none was likely to gain steam after the 2018 midterm elec-
tions, when the Democrats regained the House of Representa-
tives.  
As a second advantage, assaults on the CFPB’s foundation, 
if successful, could halt new consumer financial protection initi-
atives surreptitiously. Numerous consumer protections are pub-
licly popular110 and repealing them could endanger a politician’s 
career. Accordingly, the structural approach offered an efficient 
way of blocking consumer-facing protections across the board 
while flying under the radar. The earliest campaign to under-
mine the Bureau’s underpinnings took place in Congress, as I 
now describe. 
 
 108. See infra Parts III.C.3, III.D. 
 109. See Alan Rappeport, Bill to Erase Some Dodd-Frank Banking Rules 
Passes in House, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/ 
08/business/dealbook/house-financial-regulations-dodd-frank.html [hereinafter 
Rappeport, Bill to Erase] (reporting that the Senate was unlikely to vote to re-
peal the CFPB). For scattered instances to the contrary, see, e.g., S. 370, 115th 
Cong. (2017) (bill filed by Senator Ted Cruz to abolish the CFPB); H.R. 1031, 
115th Cong. (2017) (parallel bill filed by Rep. John Ratcliffe in the House of 
Representatives). 
 110. See, e.g., AFR/CRL: Poll Shows Fifth Year of Strong, Bipartisan Support for 
Tough Wall Street Reforms, AM. FOR FIN. REFORM (July 18, 2017), https:// 
ourfinancialsecurity.org/2017/07/afr-statement-take-on-wall-street-agenda 
-july-19/ (reporting that “[s]eventy-eight percent of likely voters say that tough 
rules and enforcement are needed to prevent the kinds of practices that led to 
the financial crisis”). 
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A. CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES AGAINST THE CFPB 
Starting with the CFPB’s establishment in 2011, its con-
gressional opponents regularly filed bills to hamstring the Bu-
reau,111 including many that were aimed at altering the Bu-
reau’s structure.112 None of these congressional attacks, save 
one, has succeeded to date. 
During the Obama Administration, the opposition bills had 
scant prospects of passage due to the Presidential veto power. 
The prospects for success appeared to improve with the election 
of President Trump, when Republicans gained control of the 
White House and Congress. After President Trump took office, 
members of Congress filed renewed bills to change the CFPB’s 
leadership structure from a Director to a bipartisan commis-
sion113 and to convert its funding source to congressional appro-
priations,114 among other attempts. 
The most serious Trump-era bill through 2018 was a mas-
sive piece of legislation named the Financial CHOICE Act of 
2017,115 championed by the Republican Tea Party leadership of 
 
 111. See, e.g., Ben Lane, Bipartisan Push Begins in Congress to Change 
CFPB Leadership to Commission, HOUSINGWIRE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www 
.housingwire.com/articles/42756-bipartisan-push-begins-in-congress-to-change 
-cfpb-leadership-to-commission (noting efforts before 2017). 
 112. See, e.g., S. 3196, 114th Cong. (2016) (proposal to change leadership to 
board); S. 3318, 114th Cong. (2016) (proposal to change funding to appropria-
tions); S. 1383, 114th Cong. (2015) (same); H.R. 1266, 114th Cong. (2015) (pro-
posal to switch to commission); H.R. 1261, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposal to 
change funding to appropriations); H.R. 1486, 114th Cong. (2015) (same); S. 
2213, 113th Cong. (2014) (proposal to change to a commission structure); H.R. 
3193, 113th Cong. (2014) (same and change to funding through appropriations); 
H.R. 2446, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposal to adopt a commission structure in lieu 
of a Director); H.R. 2402, 113th Cong. (2013) (same); H.R. 450, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (proposal to change funding to appropriations); H.R. 3192, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (same); H.R. 3519, 113th Cong. (2013) (same and related proposals); S. 
205, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposal to change to a commission structure and fund-
ing through appropriations); H.R. 1121, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposal to replace 
the CFPB Director with a bipartisan Commission); H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (same); H.R. 1640, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposal to change the CFPB’s 
funding mechanism to appropriations); H.R. 1355, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposal 
to eliminate the independent agency status and independent funding of the Bu-
reau); S. 737, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposal to eliminate the independent agency 
status and independent funding of the Bureau). 
 113. See, e.g., H.R. 5266, 115th Cong. (2018); S. 105, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 114. See, e.g., S. 387, 115th Cong. (2017). Mick Mulvaney later called on Con-
gress to subject the Bureau to the appropriations process. CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 2 (2018) [here-
inafter 2018 Semi-Annual Report], https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
documents/cfpb_semi-annual-report_spring-2018.pdf. 
 115. H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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the House Financial Services Committee. The bill proposed dras-
tic changes to the CFPB’s structure, including stripping the Bu-
reau of its examination powers,116 subjecting the agency to the 
congressional appropriations process,117 changing the Director’s 
tenure to service at will,118 reducing employees’ pay to the Gen-
eral Schedule pay scale,119 scaling back the Bureau’s enforce-
ment ability,120 and knocking out its data collection abilities.121 
In addition, the Financial CHOICE Act proposed eliminating the 
Bureau’s power to regulate UDAAPs,122 payday lending,123 vehi-
cle-title loans,124 discriminatory indirect auto lending prac-
tices,125 and mandatory arbitration clauses.126 
The Financial CHOICE Act sailed through the House of 
Representatives.127 But the bill died a quiet death after Senate 
Majority leader Mitch McConnell expressed doubt, given his 
slender Republican majority and fierce Democratic opposition, 
that the bill could win the sixty votes needed in the Senate to 
overcome a filibuster.128 Instead, Congress, at the Senate’s be-
hest, passed a modest, bipartisan financial reform bill that left 
the CFPB intact.129 
Congressional opponents of the CFPB did have one notable 
success in late 2017, which involved nullifying the CFPB’s man-
datory arbitration rule.130 The supporters of the legislation were 
 
 116. Id. §§ 711, 724, 727. 
 117. Id. § 712. 
 118. Id. § 711.  
 119. Id. § 723. 
 120. Id. §§ 714–715. 
 121. Id. § 731. 
 122. Id. § 735. 
 123. Id. § 733. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. § 734. 
 126. Id. § 737. 
 127. See, e.g., Rappeport, Bill to Erase, supra note 109 (noting that the bill 
passed with a vote of 233 to 186). 
 128. See Ben Lane, McConnell Throws Cold Water on Republican Dodd-
Frank Repeal Efforts, HOUSINGWIRE (May 17, 2017), https://www.housingwire 
.com/articles/40144-mcconnell-throws-cold-water-on-republican-dodd-frank 
-repeal-efforts. 
 129. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-174 (2018). 
 130. Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017). This joint 
resolution of Congress disapproved the mandatory arbitration rule under the 
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. See Arbitration Agreements, 
82 Fed. Reg. 55,500 (Nov. 22, 2017); Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 
33,210 (July 19, 2017).  
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able to win Senate passage because approval required only a 
simple majority.131 Their attempts to revoke the Bureau’s pay-
day lending rule132 under that same statute failed, however, af-
ter the congressional deadline for action expired.133 
As this history demonstrates, efforts to dismantle the CFPB 
through congressional legislation have been unsuccessful to 
date. This outcome was by no means assured, given the Repub-
licans’ control of both houses plus the White House in 2017 and 
2018. Part of the explanation lies in the filibuster threat, which 
helped block Senate passage of the Financial CHOICE Act.134 
And part of the explanation involves the optics of passing legis-
lation to harm consumers and the feared effect on re-election 
prospects, particularly in the Senate. The one bill that the Bu-
reau’s opponents were able to pass—which overturned the man-
datory arbitration rule—did not pose the same bad optics, be-
cause it involved conflict resolution procedures that the public 
did not generally understand. In contrast, the payday lending 
rule and the failed congressional effort to rescind it concerned a 
type of disreputable lending that constituents wanted regu-
lated.135 At the end of the day, the congressional majority lacked 
the stomach to countermand that rule or dismantle the Bureau. 
 
Congress also used the Congressional Review Act to nullify the CFPB’s 
2013 guidance on indirect auto lending. See Pub. L. No. 115-172, 132 Stat. 1290 
(2018) (overturning CFPB, Bulletin re: Indirect Auto Lending and Compliance 
with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Mar. 21, 2013), https://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf ) ; 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 61, at 4 (protesting that guidance); Rachel 
Witkowski, House Repeals CFPB’s Controversial Indirect Auto Lending Guid-
ance, AM. BANKER (May 8, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/house 
-repeals-cfpbs-indirect-auto-lending-guidance. 
 131. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, Deadline Expires for CRA Resolution to Override 
CFPB Payday Lending Rule, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (May 17, 2018), https:// 
www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/05/17/deadline-expires-for-cra 
-resolution-to-override-cfpb-payday-lending-rule.  
 132. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 
Fed. Reg. 54,472 (Nov. 17, 2017). 
 133. See Kaplinsky, supra note 131. For discussion of subsequent efforts to 
stall implementation of the payday lending rule, see infra Part III.B.1. 
 134. See Brena Swanson, Is the Financial CHOICE Act DOA in the Senate?, 
HOUSINGWIRE (June 9, 2017), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/40390-is 
-the-financial-choice-act-doa-in-the-senate (predicting that the bill’s chances of 
passing the Senate would be hindered by the requirement of a filibuster-proof 
majority vote). 
 135. See, e.g., AM. FOR FIN. REFORM, supra note 110 (finding that the public 
“supports key CFPB initiatives: a ban on forced arbitration, the practice of deny-
ing consumers their day in court; regulation of high-interest payday lending; 
and rules on debt collection” (emphasis added)). 
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Instead, they looked to the Bureau’s new Acting Director to do 
so from within. 
B. JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE CFPB 
Judicial challenges to the design of the CFPB took off slowly, 
but gained steam near the end of the Obama Administration and 
mounted after the election of President Trump. The most serious 
line of cases to date raised constitutional objections to the 
CFPB’s single Director structure. This argument found initial 
success in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
where then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh, writing for a three-judge 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, held that 
the Bureau’s single Director structure failed to pass constitu-
tional muster under Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution 
due to the president’s inability to fire the Director at will.136 As 
the remedy, the court severed the for-cause provision protecting 
the Director from termination for any reason.137 Subsequently, 
the D.C. Circuit granted rehearing en banc and reversed, holding 
that protection of agency heads from at-will firing by the Presi-
dent is a longstanding and constitutional mainstay of many fed-
eral independent agencies.138 After the en banc court issued its 
PHH decision, it summarily affirmed dismissal of a similar chal-
lenge, whereupon the plaintiff in the latter case filed a petition 
for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.139 
 
 136. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016), aff ’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc). The Dodd-Frank Act spe-
cifically states that the “President may remove the Director for inefficiency, ne-
glect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012). 
 137. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d 1. This was not Judge Kavanaugh’s first foray into 
the legality of the CFPB’s leadership. In an earlier decision, State National 
Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, he had ruled that a national bank had standing to 
challenge President Obama’s recess appointment of Richard Cordray as the 
CFPB’s first Director. 795 F.3d 48, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Judge Kavanaugh re-
manded the case to the district court, which ultimately entered judgment 
against the plaintiff. State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, No. 12-1032 (ESH) 
(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018). After the D.C. Circuit summarily affirmed dismissal in 
State National Bank of Big Spring v. Mnuchin, No. 18-5062 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 
2018), the bank petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari on grounds 
that Congress’s decision to vest the CFPB’s leadership in a single Director was 
unconstitutional. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, State Nat’l Bank of Big 
Spring v. Mnuchin, No. 18-307 (U.S. Sept. 6, 2018). The Supreme Court denied 
the petition. Denial of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, State Nat’l Bank of Big 
Spring v. Mnuchin, No. 18-307 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2019). 
 138. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 102. 
 139. See supra note 137. 
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Similar constitutional challenges are making their way 
through other federal circuits. In June 2018, Judge Loretta A. 
Preska of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held that the Bureau’s single-director leadership and 
its independent funding through the Federal Reserve were sep-
aration of powers violations of the U.S. Constitution.140 The 
CFPB under Mr. Mulvaney appealed the decision to the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals.141 In the meantime, the Ninth Circuit 
has heard oral argument on the constitutional issue142 and the 
Fifth Circuit has a similar constitutional claim on its docket.143 
This litigation strategy stands out for two reasons. First, if 
and when it succeeds, the ramifications for the Bureau could be 
drastic. If the Second, Fifth, or Ninth Circuits parts way with 
the D.C. Circuit and holds the CFPB’s Directorship unconstitu-
tional, that would produce a circuit split that the Supreme Court 
in all likelihood would resolve. Justice Kavanaugh’s confirma-
tion is likely to produce a five-justice majority holding a single 
Director terminable for cause unconstitutional.144 If the Court so 
ruled, it could preserve the single-Director structure by severing 
the good cause termination provision (as then-Judge Kavanaugh 
did below), but there is no assurance that the Court would do so. 
Second, this litigation strategy is marked by internal strife, 
due to opposition from important conservative bedfellows. The 
PHH case and its progeny produced a rift between the corporate 
plaintiffs in the constitutional cases and the Republican leaders 
in Congress plus the CFPB.145 Once the Trump Administration 
 
 140. CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018). 
 141. Notice of Appeal, CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, Civil Action No. 
1:17-cv-00890-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2018) (docketed on appeal as CFPB v. 
RD Legal Funding, LLC, No. 18-2743 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2018)); see also Evan 
Weinberger, CFPB to Take Constitutionality Ruling to Second Circuit, BLOOM-
BERG L. (Sept. 17, 2018), http://www.bna.com/cfpb-constitutionality-ruling 
-n730144826471. 
 142. CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, No. 17-56324 (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 2019). 
 143. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, No. 18-
60302 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 2018). 
 144. Other authors have speculated on Justice Kavanaugh’s future rulings 
regarding presidential power based on his ruling as to the CFPB. See, e.g., Rich-
ard E. Levy, Presidential Power in the Obama and Trump Administrations, 87 
J. KAN. B. ASS’N 46, 55 (2018). 
 145. See Mara Gawarecki, Republicans File Brief Supporting Mulvaney, 
CFPB J. (Mar. 6, 2018), http://cfpbjournal.com/republicans-file-brief-supporting 
-mulvaney (quoting a Republican Senator who led the group of legislators in 
submitting the amicus brief praising Mulvaney as keeping the CFPB “account-
able”). 
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gained the power to appoint the CFPB Director, the White House 
and Congress became loath to attack the constitutionality of the 
single-Director design. A spectacle ensued as the Trump-era 
CFPB defended the agency’s constitutionality in the Second Cir-
cuit case and the congressional leadership supported the single-
Director structure. 
The Republican majority in Congress found itself in an awk-
ward position with respect to the judicial attack on the CFPB. 
Even though the majority did not make significant legislative in-
roads on the Bureau’s power, the Republican congressional lead-
ers and the White House were not on board with, and even went 
so far as to oppose, the pending constitutional court chal-
lenges.146 With Congress mired in gridlock and the judicial strat-
egy gone haywire, Republican leaders pinned their hopes on a 
third strategy for defanging the CFPB. That strategy involved 
deploying the White House and the Trump-appointed leadership 
of the CFPB to erode the Bureau’s foundations from within: as it 
were, through an inside job. 
C. WHITE HOUSE ACTIONS TO UNDERMINE CFPB 
INDEPENDENCE 
The single most important step taken by the Trump Admin-
istration to render the CFPB impotent was to put the Bureau 
under direct White House control. President Trump accom-
plished this step when he appointed John “Mick” Mulvaney, the 
OMB Director, as the CFPB’s Acting Director in November 2017 
after Richard Cordray stepped down. Previously, as a South Car-
olina congressman, Mr. Mulvaney had reportedly called the 
CFPB “a ‘sad, sick’ joke,”147 identifying himself in the process as 
a determined foe of the Bureau. 
Mr. Mulvaney’s appointment provoked controversy for a 
number of reasons, including a statutory conflict about who 
could properly serve as Acting Director. In a court challenge,148 
 
 146. See id. 
 147. OMB Chief Mulvaney Could Be Temporary CFPB Boss, AM. BANKER 
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/articles/omb-chief-mulvaney 
-could-be-temporary-cfpb-boss; Alan Rappeport, Mick Mulvaney Calls for ‘Humil-
ity’ from Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/us/politics/mick-mulvaney-consumer 
-financial-protection-bureau.html. 
 148. English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307, 311 (D.D.C. 2018). The District 
Court denied Ms. English’s motion for a preliminary injunction and she ap-
pealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. Plaintiff ’s Notice of Appeal, English v. Trump, No. 18-5007 (D.C. Cir. 
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the Bureau’s Deputy Director, Leandra English, argued that she 
was the rightful Acting Director, based on a Dodd-Frank Act di-
rective providing that the Deputy Director of the CFPB 
“shall . . . serve as acting Director in the absence or unavailabil-
ity of the Director.”149 President Trump instead invoked the Fed-
eral Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 as authority for Mr. Mul-
vaney’s appointment.150 
Despite the apparent statutory conflict, neither the Presi-
dent nor Mr. Mulvaney asked a court to resolve it. Instead, Mr. 
Mulvaney seized control of the Bureau’s premises by occupying 
the executive suite and installing himself as Acting Director.151 
It was left to Ms. English to litigate the issue in court. 
Mr. Mulvaney’s appointment and later conduct as Acting Di-
rector were similarly controversial due to his close financial ties 
to the financial services industry.152 While Acting Director, he 
gave remarks to the American Bankers Association (ABA) indi-
cating that he had insisted on “pay to play” while he was a con-
gressman. As he reportedly explained to the ABA, while he 
served in Congress, the only lobbyists he agreed to meet were 
ones who contributed money: “If you were a lobbyist who never 
gave us money, I didn’t talk to you. If you were a lobbyist who 
gave us money, I might talk to you.”153  
But Mr. Mulvaney’s appointment put more at stake than in-
dustry capture or an interpretive dispute over dry successorship 
 
Jan. 12, 2018). Following oral argument, Ms. English resigned as Deputy Direc-
tor in the middle of 2018 and voluntarily dismissed her appeal. Order, English 
v. Trump, No. 18-5007 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2018), 2018 WL 3526296. 
 149. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5) (2012). 
 150. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2) (2012). 
 151. See Renae Merle, Dueling Officials Spend Chaotic Day Vying to Lead 
Federal Consumer Watchdog, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/two-dueling-officials-spend-chaotic 
-day-vying-to-lead-federal-consumer-watchdog/2017/11/27/381eada2-d39c 
-11e7-b62d-d9345ced896d_story.html [hereinafter Merle, Dueling Officials] (de-
scribing the conflict following Mulvaney’s appointment). 
 152. See generally June 7 Comment, supra note 75, at 27–28. 
 153. See Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., CFPB, Remarks at the American 
Bankers Association Annual Conference 11 (Apr. 24, 2018) [hereinafter April 
24, 2018 Remarks] (transcript available at https://www.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/4446622-Transcript-Mulvaney-ABA-Conference-4-24-2018.html). 
Mr. Mulvaney was quoted as adding: “If you came from back home and sat in 
my lobby, I talk to you without exception, regardless of the financial contribu-
tions.” Id. 
  
2576 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2543 
 
statutes. For when he assumed his duties as CFPB Acting Direc-
tor, he continued to serve as Director of OMB.154 In this latter 
position, he received his paycheck from OMB and was subject to 
firing at will by the President.155 His concurrent appointment 
thus put the CFPB under direct White House control. 
The White House was able to engineer this outcome because 
OMB “is an office in the Executive Office of the President.”156 As 
OMB Director, Mr. Mulvaney is a White House official. By in-
stalling the sitting OMB director as acting Bureau head, the 
President effectively took command of the CFPB. Indeed, when 
Mr. Mulvaney took office at the CFPB, he reportedly confirmed 
as much, boasting to the press: “the Trump Administration is 
now in charge” of the CFPB.157 Later, the press reported that 
while Acting Director, Mr. Mulvaney met with political donors 
at a closed-door Republican National Committee fundraising 
event in the run-up to the 2018 midyear congressional elec-
tions.158 
This political interference flouted the spirit if not the letter 
of the Dodd-Frank Act. In that legislation, Congress issued nu-
merous prohibitions against OMB incursions into CFPB affairs. 
First and foremost, Congress expressly stated in Dodd-Frank 
that the CFPB was to be “an independent bureau.”159 Despite 
this injunction, President Trump put the OMB Director in 
 
 154. See Merle, Dueling Officials, supra note 151 (reporting that Mr. Mul-
vaney said “he plan[ned] to work three days a week at the agency and three 
days at OMB”). 
 155. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, 
115TH CONG. (SHERROD BROWN, RANKING MEMBER), PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: 
THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU UNDER THE TRUMP ADMIN-
ISTRATION 10 (2018) [hereinafter Minority Staff Report], https://www.banking 
.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pushing%20the%20Envelope%20-%20Mick% 
20Mulvaney%20at%20CFPB%20FINAL.pdf. 
 156. 31 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). 
 157. Mick Mulvaney, Acting CFPB Director Mulvaney News Conference, C-
SPAN (Nov. 27, 2017), http://cs.pn/2AxVT65. 
 158. See Alexander Burns & Kenneth P. Vogel, Top Trump Adviser Says Ted 
Cruz Could Lose Texas Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/us/politics/republicans-midterms-ted-cruz.html. Sen-
ator Elizabeth Warren expressed concerns that the RNC meeting not only com-
promised CFPB independence, but amounted to a violation of the Hatch Act. 
Warren Questions Mulvaney About “Closed Door Event” with Campaign Donors, 
GOP Officials, ELIZABETH WARREN (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.warren 
.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018.09.19%20Letter%20to%20Mulvaney%20on% 
20Meeting%20with%20GOP%20Donors.pdf. 
 159. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012). 
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charge of the Bureau, under circumstances providing no oppor-
tunity for Senate confirmation. Further, Dodd-Frank prohibits 
OMB from asserting “jurisdiction or oversight over the affairs or 
operations of the Bureau.”160 Since OMB can only act through 
human agency, Mr. Mulvaney, as OMB Director, became OMB’s 
single most powerful instrument of CFPB control. 
The Dodd-Frank Act contains additional provisions to cor-
don off the CFPB from OMB, which Mr. Mulvaney’s appointment 
subverted. As concurrent head of the CFPB and OMB, Mr. Mul-
vaney reviewed and approved any proposed “legislative recom-
mendations, or testimony or comments on legislation” by the 
CFPB to Congress, contrary to Congress’s intent in the Dodd-
Frank Act.161 In the same dual capacity, he gave final approval 
to the CFPB’s financial operating plans, forecasts, and quarterly 
reports, again raising questions about faithfulness to the Dodd-
Frank Act.162 Indeed, far from walling off the White House’s fis-
cal objectives, Mr. Mulvaney openly tipped his OMB hat when 
he wrote a letter to the Federal Reserve requesting $0 in funding 
for the Bureau for second quarter 2018, explaining that this 
would “reduce the federal deficit[.]”163 Further, the President’s 
budget for fiscal year 2019, which was prepared under Mr. Mul-
vaney’s aegis, proposed major funding cuts for the Bureau 
through 2028.164 Meanwhile, Mr. Mulvaney ordered the Bu-
reau’s staff to prepare a report identifying all White House exec-
utive orders that the agency could comply with voluntarily.165 
As simultaneous CFPB chief and OMB Director, Mr. Mul-
vaney also reviewed and made final decisions on CFPB rulemak-
ing initiatives. This undermined E.O. 12,866, which exempts all 
 
 160. Id. § 5497(a)(4)(E). 
 161. See id. § 5492(c)(4). 
 162. See id. § 5497(a)(4)(E) (stating that “[t]his subsection may not be con-
strued as implying any obligation on the part of the Director to consult with or 
obtain the consent or approval of the Director of [OMB] with respect to any re-
port, plan, forecast, or other information referred to in [§ 5497(a)(4)(A)] or any 
jurisdiction or oversight over the affairs or operations of the Bureau”). 
 163. Letter from Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., CFPB, to Janet L. Yellen, 
Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 17, 2018), http://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_fy2018_q2_funding-request-letter-to 
-frb.pdf. 
 164. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AN AMERICAN BUDGET: MAJOR SAV-
INGS AND REFORMS 189 (Fiscal Year 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp 
-content/uploads/2018/02/msar-fy2019.pdf (proposing budget cuts that would 
“impose financial discipline, [and] reduce wasteful spending” at the CFPB).  
 165. See Jesse Eisinger, The CFPB’s Declaration of Dependence, PROPUB-
LICA (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/consumer-financial 
-protection-bureau-declaration-of-dependence. 
  
2578 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2543 
 
federal banking regulators, including the CFPB, from OIRA re-
view.166 The concern about E.O. 12,866 arose because OIRA is an 
office within OMB167 and reported to Mr. Mulvaney. By virtue of 
this chain of command, CFPB rulemaking effectively became 
subject to OIRA sign-off so long as Mr. Mulvaney held his CFPB 
and OMB posts. In fact, Mr. Mulvaney made no secret of the fact 
that he measured CFPB rulemaking proposals according to 
OMB and OIRA standards, reportedly telling the American 
Banker: “You could imagine that the Office of Management and 
Budget under the Trump administration might look very cau-
tiously, even cynically, against rules that were produced by” Mr. 
Cordray.168 This implicit OIRA oversight provided another vehi-
cle for White House control of the Bureau.169 
If E.O. 12,866 and Dodd-Frank’s provisions walling off the 
CFPB from OMB mean anything, they mean that no OMB Di-
rector or employee may simultaneously serve as Acting CFPB 
Director. By appointing Mr. Mulvaney to lead the CFPB while 
he continued to head OMB, President Trump put the CFPB un-
der the thumb of the White House. Indeed, in a tweet about the 
unfolding Wells Fargo consumer protection scandal,170 President 
Trump showed that he regarded “Mr. Mulvaney as little more 
than a typical White House staffer”171 and thought he could di-
rect CFPB enforcement: “Fines and penalties against Wells 
Fargo Bank for their bad acts against their customers and others 
will not be dropped, as has incorrectly been reported, but will be 
pursued and, if anything, substantially increased. I will cut Regs 
but make penalties severe when caught cheating!”172 
 
 166. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (discussing the im-
portance of shielding the CFPB from OIRA review in ensuring its neutrality). 
 167. 31 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
 168. Ian McKendry, Mulvaney’s First Days at CFPB: Payday, Personnel and 
a Prank, AM. BANKER (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ 
cfpbs-mulvaney-backs-congressional-repeal-of-payday-lending-rule. 
 169. See generally Office of Management and Budget, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb (last visited Apr. 12, 2019) (stating that OMB, 
which includes OIRA, “serves the President of the United States in overseeing 
the implementation of his vision across the Executive Branch”). 
 170. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2017, 7:18 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/939152197090148352. 
 171. Minority Staff Report, supra note 155, at 10. 
 172. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2017, 7:18 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/939152197090148352. 
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Of course, legally, the President lacks statutory authority to 
dictate whether the CFPB, as an independent agency, takes en-
forcement actions, imposes fines, or adopts or rescinds rules. 
Nevertheless, he trumpeted his ability to do just that.  
In July 2018, anticipating an eventual end to Mr. Mul-
vaney’s tenure as Acting CFPB Director, President Trump nom-
inated a trusted Mulvaney deputy at OMB, Kathleen Kraninger, 
as permanent CFPB Director.173 Ms. Kraninger had no relevant 
experience in banking regulation or consumer financial protec-
tion; her main qualification was as a White House official.174 In 
December 2018, the Senate confirmed Ms. Kraninger as Direc-
tor,175 sealing the White House’s influence over the CFPB long 
term and raising fears about more CFPB budget cuts to come. In 
these ways, the White House acted to undermine the agency’s 
statutory independence and to pave the way for an internal as-
sault on the CFPB’s structure. 
III.  EXECUTING THE INSIDE JOB   
Once the White House installed Mr. Mulvaney as CFPB 
chief, he acted immediately to execute the inside job. This in-
cluded an impressive number of steps to undermine the Bureau’s 
structure and its ability to protect consumers. 
A. ACCESS TO DATA 
One of Mr. Mulvaney’s first targets of the CFPB’s structure 
was the Bureau’s access to data and with it, the agency’s ability 
to detect consumer harms and undertake informed decision-
making. This offensive was a direct assault on the Bureau’s com-
mitment to fact-based policy.  
Without the requisite data, CFPB rulemaking, supervision 
and enforcement could not operate. Presumably aware of that, 
Mr. Mulvaney placed a freeze on CFPB data gathering as one of 
his first actions as Acting Director. Specifically, on December 4, 
 
 173. See Glenn Thrush, White House Confirms That Mulvaney Deputy Is 
Pick to Lead Consumer Bureau, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2018), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/us/politics/kraninger-consumer-financial-bureau 
.html. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See Senate Approves Trump’s Nominee for Watchdog Agency, CNBC 
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/06/senate-approves-trumps 
-nominee-for-watchdog-agency.html. Mr. Mulvaney then became Acting White 
House Chief of Staff. 
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2017, Mr. Mulvaney announced that he was freezing all collec-
tion by the Bureau of personal information, including loan level 
data, citing privacy and information security.176 In imposing the 
freeze, Mr. Mulvaney reportedly halted the collection of data 
that could trace back to either consumers or businesses.177 Ap-
proximately six months later, he reversed course and announced 
that he intended to resume the collection of consumers’ person-
ally identifiable information because an outside consultant had 
determined that the agency’s information security systems “ap-
peared to be well-secured.”178 
Although the data freeze was temporary, it had a structural 
effect by effectively making it impossible for at least three of the 
CFPB’s empirically oriented units—supervision, enforcement, 
and research—to carry out their responsibilities. The data freeze 
shuttered the Extranet, which CFPB examiners depended on to 
upload company data in advance of examinations. This crippled 
supervision’s ability to conduct examinations and analyze 
trends. Meanwhile, the Bureau’s enforcement attorneys were 
barred from reviewing electronic evidence produced in discovery, 
which hampered enforcement.179 The action also stopped the re-
search team from the long-planned onboarding of data that were 
necessary to carry out the five-year lookback reviews of certain 
rulemakings mandated by Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act.180 
Tellingly, Mr. Mulvaney’s data freeze did not conform with 
accepted cybersecurity norms. No other federal agency had 
halted data onboarding in response to a data breach,181 and par-
ticularly not where its systems “appeared to be well-secured,” as 
 
 176. See generally June 7 Comment, supra note 75, at 19–20. 
 177. See, e.g., Yuka Hayashi, New CFPB Chief Curbs Data Collection, Citing 
Cybersecurity Worries, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
new-cfpb-chief-curbs-data-collection-citing-cybersecurity-worries-1512429736. 
 178. Evan Weinberger, CFPB to Resume Data Collection After Data Security 
Review, BLOOMBERG L. (May 31, 2018), https://www.bna.com/cfpb-resume-data 
-n57982093111. 
 179. See Eisinger, supra note 165; James Kim & Bowen “Bo” Ranney, CFPB 
Data Collection Freeze Impacting CFPB Examinations, CONSUMER FIN. MONI-
TOR (Ballard Spahr, PA) (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor 
.com/2017/12/15/cfpb-data-collection-freeze-impacting-cfpb-examinations; Let-
ter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren to Leandra English, Acting Dir., & Mick Mul-
vaney, Dir., CFPB, 2–4 (Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Warren Letter], https://www 
.housingwire.com/ext/resources/files/Editorial/2018_01_04_Letter_to_English_ 
and_Mulvaney_on_CFPB_Data_Collection.pdf. 
 180. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(d) (2012). 
 181. Nor had the Bureau’s Inspector General (IG) so advised. Starting in 
May 2017, the IG issued several reports on data security at the Bureau. See 
June 7 Comment, supra note 75, at 20 n.90. In the most important of these 
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was the case with the Bureau.182 Instead, if a data breach occurs, 
federal agencies typically plug the leak as quickly as possible 
while resuming data collection.183 The failure to observe this pro-
tocol raised questions whether the real purpose of the data freeze 
was to impede the core functions of the Bureau. 
Mr. Mulvaney’s inroads on the Bureau’s evidence-based reg-
ulation did not stop there. He also announced plans184 to roll 
back amendments185 to the rule implementing the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act (HMDA) under his predecessor, Mr. 
Cordray. The HMDA dataset is a vital, publicly available source 
for analyzing developments in the home mortgage origination 
market and the effects of mortgage trends by race and ethnicity. 
Under Mr. Cordray, the amendments to the HMDA rule fixed 
troubling gaps in HMDA data by adding new data points186 that 
were needed to accurately gauge mortgage market risks. Some 
of those data points were mandated by Dodd-Frank187 and the 
Bureau added more data points using its discretionary authority 
 
reports, the IG found that the Bureau’s information security program was oper-
ating at a level-3 maturity (consistently implemented), on a scale of 1 to 5, and 
that several of the program’s activities were operating at a higher level-4 ma-
turity. Despite room to improve, the CFPB’s cybersecurity readiness exceeded 
that of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Securities & Exchange Commission, and the Department of 
the Treasury, which never stopped data collection. Warren Letter, supra note 
179, at 4–5. While the IG proposed improvements, consistent with cybersecurity 
norms, it never recommended a halt to the Bureau’s data collection, whether for 
personally identifiable information (PII) or otherwise.  
 182. See Weinberger, supra note 178, at *2. 
 183. Kate Berry, Mulvaney Response to CFPB Data Security Gaps Baffles 
Cyber Experts, AM. BANKER (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/ 
news/mulvaney-response-to-cfpb-data-security-gaps-baffles-cyber-experts; 
Warren Letter, supra note 179, at 2–4. 
 184. Kate Berry, CFPB’s Mulvaney Plots HMDA Rollback, but It May Not 
Matter, AM. BANKER (May 29, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ 
cfpbs-mulvaney-plots-hmda-rollback-but-it-may-not-matter [hereinafter Berry, 
CFPB’s Mulvaney]. 
 185. Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 80 Fed. Reg. 66,128 (Oct. 28, 
2015) [hereinafter HMDA Amendments], amended by Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure (Regulation C), 82 Fed. Reg. 43,088 (Sept. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1003). 
 186. These data points include age, pricing information, loan term, interest 
rate, teaser rate period, non-amortizing features, loan types, automated under-
writing results, and certain unique identifiers, plus yardsticks for credit scores 
and debt-to-income ratios. See HMDA Amendments, supra note 185, at 66,  
128–29. 
 187. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1094, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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under Dodd-Frank.188 Had these data points been available be-
fore 2008, the deterioration of the home mortgage market would 
have been apparent.  
With the HMDA rule amendments due to take effect on Jan-
uary 1, 2018, opponents mobilized to take action. First, they con-
vinced Congress to enact a regulatory relief provision exempting 
eighty-five percent of banks from having to report the new data 
points mandated by Dodd-Frank.189 Then, Mr. Mulvaney report-
edly announced that he planned to rescind the other, new discre-
tionary data points in a speech to the National Association of 
Realtors in May 2018.190 He accomplished this by issuing an in-
terpretive and procedural rule in August 2018, excusing most of 
the same eighty-five percent of mortgage lenders from reporting 
the added discretionary data points.191 Despite the drastic na-
ture of this measure, he failed to provide notice or opportunity 
for public comment and made the new rule immediately effective 
upon Federal Register publication.192  
While Mr. Mulvaney’s HMDA rollback was plainly a sub-
stantive reform, it was simultaneously structural in nature. It 
had damaging structural impact by limiting the Bureau’s mort-
gage analytical capabilities, with negative repercussions for 
rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement. Worse, it did grave 
harm to fair lending enforcement, because HMDA is the only na-
tionwide data set that tracks mortgage outcomes by race and 
ethnicity. 
Bottom line, the Bureau’s evidence-based approach and the 
proper functioning of its divisions depend on robust data sources. 
By hampering the Bureau’s access to data, Mr. Mulvaney im-
paired the Bureau’s capability to detect emerging harms and to 
build an evidentiary foundation for needed future actions. Tar-
 
 188. Id.; see also Berry, CFPB’s Mulvaney, supra note 184. 
 189. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-174, § 104(a)(2) (2018) [hereinafter EGRRCPA]; see Berry, 
CFPB’s Mulvaney, supra note 184. Specifically, this act granted an exemption 
to all insured depository institutions and credit unions that originated less than 
500 closed-end home mortgages per year for two successive years. EGRRCPA, 
supra, § 104(a)(2). 
 190. Berry, CFPB’s Mulvaney, supra note 184. 
 191. Partial Exemptions From the Requirements of the Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act Under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Pro-
tection Act (Regulation C), 83 Fed. Reg. 45,325, 45,328–29 (Sept. 7, 2018) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003) [hereinafter CFPB, Partial HMDA Exemptions]. 
 192. Id. at 45,331, 45,333 (“The Bureau therefore finds that there is good 
cause to make this rule effective on September 7, 2018.”). 
  
2019] INSIDE JOB 2583 
 
geting data was an especially clever way of immobilizing the Bu-
reau, moreover, because obstacles to data access are not publicly 
salient.  
B. RULEMAKING 
Another pillar of the CFPB’s structure, the rulemaking pro-
cess, operates under strict procedural requirements to provide 
opportunity for public comment and cost-benefit analysis. Early 
in his tenure, Mr. Mulvaney took three key steps to undermine 
the procedures surrounding CFPB rulemaking. First, in a gam-
bit with little chance of passage, he asked Congress to require 
congressional approval of all major CFPB rules.193 Second, he 
circumvented APA notice-and-comment requirements by block-
ing some of the Cordray-era final rules from taking effect. While 
this latter action sought to reverse substantive policies, it also 
had major structural ramifications. Finally, Mr. Mulvaney 
seized control of the Bureau’s process for cost-benefit analysis, 
which is expected to tilt future rulemakings in favor of industry. 
1. Circumventing APA Requirements 
When an agency undergoes a leadership change, the new 
head does not have the freedom to vacate the agency’s existing 
rules by fiat or to render them a dead letter through lack of im-
plementation. Instead, with limited exceptions, the APA re-
quires a new notice-and-comment rulemaking to undo an 
agency’s final rules.194 Nevertheless, Mr. Mulvaney undertook 
an end run around that statutory requirement shortly after his 
arrival at the Bureau. 
He started by placing a thirty-day freeze on all new CFPB 
rules, regulations, and guidance.195 Soon, that freeze ripened 
into something more permanent, after Mr. Mulvaney delayed or 
halted implementation of three of the last major final rules—the 
 
 193. Mick Mulvaney, Written Testimony of Mick Mulvaney Acting Director, 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, CFPB (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/written-testimony-mick-mulvaney 
-acting-director-before-senate-committee-banking-housing-urban-affairs; see 
also 2018 Semi-Annual Report, supra note 114, at 2. 
 194. See, e.g., Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
 195. See, e.g., Acting CFPB Director Mick Mulvaney News Conference, C-
SPAN (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?437841-1/acting-cfpb 
-director-mick-mulvaney-speaks-reporters. 
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payday loan rule, the prepaid card rule, and the HMDA report-
ing rule—that Richard Cordray had approved before his depar-
ture.196 The CFPB had issued all three rules in final form but 
had not yet implemented them when Mr. Mulvaney took office. 
His attempt to override the APA by obstructing implemen-
tation was quickly met with judicial disapproval. After Congress 
passed up the opportunity to overturn the payday rule under the 
Congressional Review Act,197 a federal district court in Texas ef-
fectively reprimanded Mr. Mulvaney for freezing the payday rule 
and ordered the CFPB to put that rule into effect.198 After that, 
Mr. Mulvaney relented and announced plans to issue a proposed 
rulemaking to revise the payday rule.199 He also announced his 
 
 196. See CFPB, Partial HMDA Exemptions, supra note 191, at 45,326 (sum-
marizing slowdown of expanded HMDA reporting); CFPB Finalizes Changes to 
Prepaid Accounts Rule, CFPB (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance 
.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-finalizes-changes 
-prepaid-accounts-rule/; Renae Merle, Consumer Protection Bureau Changes Di-
rection, Will Reconsider Rule that Sets Stricter Limits on Payday Lending, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/ 
wp/2018/01/16/cfpb-changes-direction-will-reconsider-rule-that-sets-stricter 
-limits-on-payday-lending/; Evan Weinberger, CFPB Gives Cos. More Time To 
Comply With Prepaid Rule, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/1005638/cfpb-gives-cos-more-time-to-comply-with-prepaid-rule. See 
generally Hayashi, supra note 177.  
The payday loan rule freeze gained special notoriety because Mr. Mulvaney 
had previously accepted political contributions from payday lender groups while 
he was a congressman. See, e.g., Payday Lenders: Money to Congress, CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIBLE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/summary.php? 
ind=F1420&cycle=All&recipdetail=H&mem=Y (last updated Feb. 1, 2019); cf. 
Minority Staff Report, supra note 155, at 8 (“Mr. Mulvaney’s record demon-
strates he doesn’t believe in federal oversight of payday lending.”).  
Meanwhile, reportedly eight of the ten financial companies that received 
the most complaints in the Bureau’s consumer complaint database had contrib-
uted to Mr. Mulvaney when he served in Congress. See Companies with the Most 
Complaints in CFPB Database were Mulvaney Donors, PUB. CITIZEN (May 8, 
2018), https://www.citizen.org/media/press-releases/companies-most 
-complaints-cfpb-database-were-mulvaney-donors. 
 197. See Kaplinsky, supra note 131. 
 198. See Kate Berry, Federal Judge Rejects CFPB’s Effort to Halt Payday Rule, 
AM. BANKER (June 13, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/judge 
-rejects-mick-mulvaneys-effort-to-halt-cfpbs-payday-rule; Minority Staff Report, 
supra note 155, at 15. 
 199. Public Statement Regarding Payday Rule Reconsideration and Delay of 
Compliance Date, CFPB (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/newsroom/public-statement-regarding-payday-rule-reconsideration 
-and-delay-compliance-date. Subsequently, the judge in the Texas federal dis-
trict court proceeding allowed the CFPB to suspend implementation of the abil-
ity-to-repay provisions of the payday rule, pending the anticipated new rule-
making. Order at 2, Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am. v. CFPB, No. 18-CV-00295-
LY (W.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2018); see Evan Weinberger, CFPB’s Payday Lender Rule 
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intention to put his HMDA data point reporting exemptions 
through a later notice-and-comment rulemaking.200 
At the end of the day, Mr. Mulvaney’s attempt to shut down 
implementation of major CFPB rules by skirting the APA failed. 
It took a court decision, however, before he backed down and 
agreed to initiate lengthy APA rulemaking proceedings, with op-
portunity for public comment, for each of the major Cordray-pe-
riod rules he sought to prevent from going into effect. His blatant 
disregard of the APA’s requirements raised the disturbing ques-
tion whether Mr. Mulvaney was willing to violate the law to un-
dermine a key structural function of the Bureau.201 
 
Rewrite Justifies Implementation Delay, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 7, 2018), https:// 
news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/cfpbs-payday-lender-rule-rewrite 
-justifies-implementation-delay-2. Mr. Mulvaney’s successor, Director Kathy 
Kraninger, unveiled the new proposed payday rule in February 2019. Payday, 
Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 84 Fed. Reg. 4252 (pro-
posed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041). 
 200. CFPB Statement on Payday Rule, CFPB (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-statement-payday-rule [herein-
after CFPB Statement] (“The Bureau intends to engage in a rulemaking process 
so that the Bureau may reconsider the Payday Rule.”); Barbara S. Mishkin, 
CFPB Fall 2018 Rulemaking Agenda Confirms Plans to Consider Rulemaking 
on “Abusiveness” Standard, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Ballard Spahr, PA) (Oct. 
17, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/10/17/cfpb-fall-2018 
-rulemaking-agenda-confirms-plans-to-consider-rulemaking-on-abusiveness 
-standard.  
 201. The CFPB issued other public notices that obscured leadership’s in-
roads on CFPB rulemaking. For example, a Spring 2018 regulatory agenda 
omitted any mention of the pending rulemaking proceedings on overdraft pro-
tection, checking accounts, and student loan servicing, implicitly sending a sig-
nal that they would not go forward. See Kate Berry, From Overdrafts to HMDA, 
Rulemaking Has New Look at Mulvaney’s CFPB, AM. BANKER (May 16, 2018), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/list/from-overdraft-to-hmda-rulemaking-has 
-new-look-at-mick-mulvaneys-cfpb [hereinafter Berry, From Overdrafts]; CFPB 
Statement, supra note 200; Letter from Sen. Brown et al. to Leandra English, 
Acting Dir., & Mick Mulvaney, Dir., CFPB, 1 (May 18, 2018) [hereinafter 
Brown Letter], https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20to% 
20English%20and%20Mulvaney%20re%20Office%20for%20Students.pdf; 
Kelly Cochran, Spring 2018 Rulemaking Agenda, CFPB (May 10, 2018), https:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/spring-2018-rulemaking-agenda. 
The most egregious example consisted of a request for information by Mr. 
Mulvaney on the CFPB’s so-called “adopted” rules in March 2018. Request for 
Information Regarding the Bureau’s Adopted Regulations and New Rulemak-
ing Authorities, 83 Fed. Reg. 12,286 (Mar. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Adopted Reg-
ulations Request]. This vague second request, which was sweeping in scope, 
sought comment on whether the Bureau should amend virtually all of the rules 
Mr. Cordray had approved under the federal consumer financial laws. See gen-
erally Prof. Patricia A. McCoy, et al., Comment of Financial Regulation and 
Consumer Protection Scholars on Docket No. CFPB-2018-0011 (June 19, 2018), 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cfpb-comments/7. Even though the request 
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2. Cost-Benefit Analyses 
Meanwhile, in anticipation of the day when the Bureau 
would resume major new rulemakings, Mr. Mulvaney instituted 
changes to manipulate the Bureau’s cost-benefit analysis pro-
cess. These changes had the effect of subverting the integrity of 
CFPB rulemaking by rigging future rulemaking proceedings in 
favor of industry. 
Cost-benefit analyses are required by statute in major CFPB 
rulemakings.202 When the CFPB promulgates rules under the 
federal consumer financial laws, the Dodd-Frank Act directs it 
to base those proceedings on impact analyses. Section 1022(b)(2) 
of Dodd-Frank mandates the principal impact analysis, known 
as the “Section 1022(b)(2) Analysis,” and describes the cost-ben-
efit analysis that the Bureau shall conduct:203 
In prescribing a rule under the Federal consumer financial laws— 
the Bureau shall consider— 
the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, in-
cluding the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer fi-
nancial products or services resulting from such rule; and 
the impact of proposed rules on covered persons, as described in section 
5516 of [12 U.S.C.],204 and the impact on consumers in rural areas . . . . 
In addition, the Regulatory Flexibility Act205 requires the CFPB 
to consider whether its proposed and final rules would have a 
 
covered multiple major rules, it did not list the rules affected. Instead, the re-
quest referred readers to a description of final rules on the CFPB’s website. 
Adopted Regulations Request, supra, at 12,287–88 n.11. Readers were left to 
assemble the list of adopted rules by themselves. Likewise, there was no discus-
sion of any particular issues with specific rules on which Mr. Mulvaney sought 
input. Without that information, ordinary consumers—the people the CFPB is 
charged with protecting—could not be expected to comment meaningfully on 
the request. Instead, the request raised fears that Mr. Mulvaney was using the 
request for information process as a fig leaf for efforts already underway behind 
closed doors to overturn CFPB rules. Cf. Evan Weinberger, CFPB Didn’t Dis-
close Mulvaney Meeting With GOP Group in Advance, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 20, 
2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/cfpb-didnt-disclose 
-mulvaney-meeting-with-gop-group-in-advance (reporting that Mr. Mulvaney 
secretly had met with a group of Republican state attorneys general who op-
posed the payday rule). 
 202. This discussion is an expanded version of remarks in the June 7 Com-
ment, supra note 75. 
 203. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2) (2012). This provision requires the Bureau to 
“consider” potential benefits and costs, but does not require the Bureau to cal-
culate net benefit. Id. 
 204. This refers to depository institutions and credit unions with $10 billion 
or less in total assets. Id. § 5516. 
 205. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012). 
  
2019] INSIDE JOB 2587 
 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.  
Mr. Mulvaney intervened in CFPB cost-benefit analyses 
soon upon his arrival. Under Mr. Cordray, the Bureau’s rule-
makings had gone to lengths to conduct robust impact analyses 
based on voluminous data.206 But in an email to CFPB staff, Mr. 
Mulvaney demanded even more quantitative cost-benefit analy-
sis of proposed agency rules than the Bureau already pro-
vided.207 In light of the Bureau’s track record of thorough impact 
analyses under Mr. Cordray, this demand prompted the minor-
ity members of the Senate Banking Committee to label “Mr. Mul-
vaney’s claims that he intend[ed] to ramp up the CFPB’s objec-
tive, evidence-based approach to rulemaking” as a “suspicious” 
bait-and-switch.208 Mr. Mulvaney similarly questioned the rele-
vance of qualitative information in the Bureau’s cost-benefit 
analyses.209 Even more alarmingly, he created an Office of Cost 
Benefit Analysis and housed it within the Director’s office,210 
 
 206. See Minority Staff Report, supra note 155, at 21. 
 207. E-mail from Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., CFPB, Mick@cfpb.gov, to 
_DL_CFPB_AllHands@cfpb.gov (Jan. 23, 2018, 12:59 CST), https://www 
.documentcloud.org/documents/4357880-Mulvaney-Memo.html. 
 208. Minority Staff Report, supra note 155, at 21, 24–25. The Minority Staff 
Report further observed that Mr. Mulvaney did not publicly release any quan-
titative cost-benefit analyses when the CFPB published notices offering waivers 
from compliance with the payday lender registration requirements and declin-
ing to penalize lenders for data reporting errors under the Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act. Id. at 24. 
 209. See supra note 207, at 2. In the email, Mr. Mulvaney said this about the 
Bureau’s impact analyses: 
Speaking of data: the Dodd Frank Act requires us to “consider the po-
tential costs and benefits to consumers and covered persons.” To me, 
that means quantitative analysis. And while qualitative analysis cer-
tainly can play a role, it should not be to the exclusion of measurable 
“costs and benefits.” In other words: there is a lot more math in our 
future. 
To the extent that Mr. Mulvaney contemplated applying OIRA standards to 
CFPB impact analyses by fiat, that would violate the spirit of E.O. 12,866 and 
Congress’s intent to keep the CFPB independent of OMB in the Dodd-Frank 
Act. E.O. 12,866 means that OIRA standards for impact analyses do not apply 
and may not be lawfully imposed on CFPB rulemakings.  
 210. Memorandum from Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., CFPB, to DL CFPB 
All_Hands, A Note on Staffing and Bureau Organization (May 9, 2018), https:// 
www.documentcloud.org/documents/4454936-CFPB-Memo.html; Evan Wein-
berger, Mulvaney Brings More Political Oversight in CFPB Restructuring, 
BLOOMBERG L. BANKING DAILY (May 9, 2018), https://www.bna.com/Mulvaney 
-brings-political-n73014475065; see also Bureau Structure, CFPB, https://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure. 
In another action in the spring of 2018, Mr. Mulvaney re-opened the ques-
tion of the methodology and the process for the CFPB’s cost-benefit analyses in 
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thereby allowing the Director to rig the subjective assumptions 
underlying impact analyses.211  
Because Mr. Mulvaney sat at the helm, moving impact anal-
ysis out of research and into the Director’s office effectively 
placed it under White House control. This, combined with Mr. 
Mulvaney’s steps to impair the CFPB’s access to data, raised se-
rious concerns about possible plans to rig future impact analyses 
to favor industry. His efforts to hamper the Bureau’s data collec-
tion made the cost-benefit analysis he advocated even harder by 
eclipsing the Bureau’s ability to gather data on consumer bene-
fits. If that ability were compromised, in all likelihood CFPB im-
pact analyses would be artificially heavy on costs while under-
stating benefits. 
There are important reasons why Congress exempted im-
pact analyses by federal banking regulators, including the 
CFPB, from OIRA and OMB oversight. In financial regulation, 
it is generally harder to quantify benefits in the form of harms 
avoided than it is to quantify costs. The Bureau and other federal 
banking regulators must make numerous rulemaking decisions 
under conditions of incomplete data and uncertainty. Requiring 
the CFPB and other federal banking regulators to monetize all 
harms avoided—which might prove impossible—would danger-
ously tilt rulemaking analyses toward inaction and the status 
quo. In addition, the exemption in E.O. 12,866 insulates the Bu-
reau, its fellow federal banking regulators, and the health of the 
larger economy from interference for political gain by OMB and 
the White House.  
Nevertheless, Mr. Mulvaney effectively put CFPB rule-
makings under the thumb of OMB and OIRA. The decision to 
move the cost-benefit analysis unit into the Director’s office and 
 
a request for information. Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Request for Infor-
mation Regarding Bureau Rulemaking Processes, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,437,  
10,439–40 (Mar. 9, 2018). In the request, Mr. Mulvaney held his cards close to 
his chest regarding any concerns he had with the CFPB’s impact analyses. The 
request did not inform the public of the methodologies the CFPB used for its 
impact studies, including the types of qualitative and quantitative analyses that 
the Bureau used or any issues with those approaches or the underlying data. 
Nor did the request air any possible new approaches to the Bureau’s impact 
analyses going forward. Without that information, the public was in the dark 
about any changes the Bureau might be contemplating to its impact studies, 
leaving it to speculate on possible modifications. Meanwhile, Mr. Mulvaney 
moved the cost-benefit operation into his office while the request remained open 
for public comment, raising suspicions that the request was nothing more than 
cover for what Mr. Mulvaney was intent on doing anyway. 
 211. Minority Staff Report, supra note 155, at 11, 25. 
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to ultimately report to Mr. Mulvaney was the culmination of that 
campaign and a serious affront to the agency’s independence 
mandated by Congress. And it raised further concerns about his 
willingness to evade the spirit and letter of the law in order to 
exert White House control. 
C. SUPERVISION 
Supervision is pivotal to the CFPB’s design and Mr. Mul-
vaney trained his sights on that as well. Slow-walking the Bu-
reau’s supervision is easier to hide than it is for rulemaking be-
cause the APA rulemaking process demands transparency and 
lack of implementation can be detected. In contrast, the CFPB’s 
supervision process is strictly confidential, as with supervision 
by all federal banking regulators.212 The Bureau’s examination 
reports are barred from public disclosure and the Bureau does 
not publicize the date or frequency of examinations for any given 
entity.213 This secrecy makes it harder to know whether CFPB 
examinations are slowing down and how. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Mulvaney telegraphed his intentions to 
dismantle CFPB supervision through three techniques. First, he 
floated a proposal to cede CFPB examinations to the Bureau’s 
fellow regulators. Second, he narrowed the scope of CFPB exam-
inations in important respects. Finally, he stripped two im-
portant CFPB offices of their supervisory powers.  
1. Ceding CFPB Supervisory Jurisdiction to Other Regulators 
Mr. Mulvaney’s most audacious idea for disabling CFPB su-
pervision—and one that was plainly illegal—was to pass off the 
CFPB’s supervisory responsibilities to other regulators. In 
March 2018, he reportedly told the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
that he was considering giving the federal prudential banking 
regulators the lead on consumer compliance examinations for 
banks and thrifts.214 In the case of large banks, however, that 
would violate the Dodd-Frank Act, because the Act bestows “ex-
 
 212. The only exception involves the public portion of CRA examination re-
ports by the federal prudential banking regulators, see 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b) 
(2012). 
 213. See Confidential Information, 81 Fed. Reg. 58,309 (proposed Aug. 24, 
2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1070.40–.48). 
 214. See Kate Berry, CFPB Should Take Back Seat to Bank Regulators on 
Supervision: Mulvaney, AM. BANKER (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.american 
banker.com/news/cfpbs-mulvaney-suggests-effort-to-streamline-bank-exams. 
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clusive authority” on the CFPB to supervise depository institu-
tions with over $10 billion in total assets and their affiliates for 
consumer compliance.215 Congress intentionally took supervi-
sory authority over large banks and thrifts for market conduct 
compliance away from the federal prudential banking regulators 
due to their disastrous track record in the lead-up to the 2008 
financial crisis. Accordingly, if Mr. Mulvaney commanded the 
CFPB to wash its hands of large institution examinations for 
consumer compliance, no other federal regulator could legally 
perform them. 
Similarly, if Mr. Mulvaney had attempted to shift supervi-
sion of nonbank providers to the states, that would run afoul of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, which states that the Bureau “shall require 
reports and conduct examinations” of covered nonbank enti-
ties.216 The CFPB has a statutory duty to examine nonbank pro-
viders of consumer financial services and products that it cannot 
legally abdicate. Furthermore, even if the CFPB had the legal 
authority to pass the buck to the states, many nonbank providers 
lack supervision in at least some states and a few nonbank pro-
viders escape supervision in every state.217 To boot, there is no 
federal substitute for CFPB supervision, because the FTC lacks 
regular examination power over nonbanks.218 
It is hard to know the extent to which Mr. Mulvaney foisted 
CFPB’s supervisory activities off on other federal regulators or 
the states. What his proposal made apparent, however, was his 
openness to contravening Dodd-Frank’s express commands re-
garding the Bureau’s supervisory responsibilities. 
2. Narrowing the Scope of CFPB Examinations 
Another way that Mr. Mulvaney reined in supervision was 
by reducing the scope of CFPB examinations. For instance, fi-
nancial industry lawyers reportedly told the press that the Bu-
reau was strictly conducting examinations “by the book” and 
placing less emphasis on potential UDAAP violations.219 In an-
other step, Mr. Mulvaney reportedly announced that he planned 
 
 215. 12 U.S.C. § 5515(b)(1). 
 216. Id. § 5514(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 217. See Am. for Fin. Reform et al., Request for Information Regarding the 
Bureau’s Supervision Program 6, 10, 22 (May 21, 2018) [hereinafter AFR Com-
ments], https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/legislation/natl-group-detailed 
-comments-cfpb-superv.pdf.  
 218. See CARPENTER, supra note 18, at 3. 
 219. See Evan Weinberger, Trump CFPB Seen as Shifting to By-the-Book 
Supervision, BLOOMBERG L. BANKING DAILY (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.bna 
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to stop examining lenders for violations of the Military Lending 
Act (MLA),220 and would rely solely on customer complaints as 
the basis for any enforcement actions.221 Meanwhile, Seth 
Frotman, when he resigned as CFPB Assistant Director and Stu-
dent Loan Ombudsman, alleged that the new leadership had 
given in to Department of Education pressure to pare back ex-
aminations of student loan companies. According to Mr. 
Frotman: “[W]hen the Education Department unilaterally shut 
the door to routine CFPB oversight of the largest student loan 
companies, the Bureau’s current leadership folded to political 
pressure.”222  
Mr. Mulvaney took additional steps to stop the expansion of 
CFPB examinations to nonbank providers who were not yet su-
pervised. Specifically, in a move supported by industry, he can-
celled a pending rulemaking on the definition of “major partici-
pants” that was designed to expand CFPB supervision to a larger 
 
.com/trump-cfpb-seen-n57982091482. But see Ori Lev, Stephanie Robinson, Tori 
Shinohara, Anjali Garg & Christa Bieker, A Look Back At Mulvaney’s CFPB, 
and What’s Ahead in 2019, LAW360 (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/1108671/a-look-back-at-mulvaney-s-cfpb-and-what-s-ahead-in-2019 
(stating that Mr. Mulvaney had “continued the bureau’s practice of examin-
ing . . . for UDAAP concerns”). 
 220. See 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2012). 
 221. See Glenn Thrush, Mulvaney Looks to Weaken Oversight of Military 
Lending, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/us/ 
politics/mulvaney-militarylending.html. The MLA protects members of the 
armed services and their families from financial abuse, id., and confers express 
enforcement authority on the CFPB. 10 U.S.C. § 987(f ) (6); 15 U.S.C. § 
1607(a)(6) (2012); CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, MISSING IN ACTION? CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU SUPERVISION AND THE MILITARY LENDING 
ACT, CONSUMER FED’N AM. 4 & n.5 (2018), https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/11/missing-in-action-cfpb-supervision-and-the-military-lending 
-act.pdf. Nevertheless, Mr. Mulvaney reportedly opined that the Bureau lacked 
the statutory authority to oversee MLA compliance through supervisory exam-
inations. Minority Staff Report, supra note 155, at 6 n.9; PETERSON, supra, at 
2, 12; Thrush, supra. A legal analysis by the Consumer Federation of America 
concluded that the Bureau does have jurisdiction under the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act, Dodd-Frank Act title X, and the MLA to examine servicemember 
loans for MLA violations. See PETERSON, supra, at 2, 17–30; see also Letter from 
Thirty-Three State Attorneys General to Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir. (Oct. 23, 
2018), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/mla_letter_to_cfpb.pdf; Minority Staff 
Report, supra note 155, at 6 & n.12. The Department of Defense separately 
wrote Senator Bill Nelson urging supervisory examinations for MLA violations. 
See id. App. B (Letter from Stephanie Barna, Dep’t of Def., to Sen. Bill Nelson 
(Sept. 7, 2018)). 
 222. Letter from Seth Frotman, Assistant Dir. & Student Loan Ombudsman, 
CFPB, to Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir. (Aug. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Frotman 
Letter], https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/frotman.pdf; see also 
Brown Letter, supra note 201, at 1–2. 
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set of nonbanks that currently lack federal supervision.223 Com-
bined with his actions to constrict the scope of examinations, this 
action capped the decision to pull back CFPB supervision. 
3. Removing Supervisory Authority from the Fair Lending 
and Student Debt Offices 
In a further blow to supervision, Mr. Mulvaney relieved two 
of the CFPB’s most outspoken and effective offices of their su-
pervisory duties. First, he sent shock waves through the civil 
rights community by unveiling plans to move the CFPB’s Office 
of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity from SEFL to the Office 
of the Director, thereby stripping it of its supervisory function 
and placing it under his control.224 He gave that order even 
though Dodd-Frank specifically requires OFLEO to conduct 
“oversight and enforcement” of the federal fair lending laws 
within the CFPB’s jurisdiction.225 Although fair lending supervi-
sion remains housed inside SEFL,226 knowledgeable observers 
predicted that the reorganization would “likely . . . lead to a sig-
nificant decrease in the number of fair lending examinations, in-
vestigations and enforcement actions brought” by the Bureau.227  
The CFPB’s Office for Students and Young Consumers, 
which supported the work of the Student Loan Ombudsman Seth 
Frotman, suffered a similar fate.228 In May 2018, the press re-
ported that Mr. Mulvaney had exiled that office from SEFL to 
the Consumer Education and Engagement Division, confined its 
activities to consumer education, and barred it from any further 
 
 223. See Berry, From Overdrafts, supra note 201; supra note 27 and accom-
panying text. 
 224. See Minority Staff Report, supra note 155, at 8–9; David Dayen, After 
Boasting About Lowering Black Unemployment, Donald Trump Undermines the 
Federal Unit Defending Against Housing Discrimination, INTERCEPT (Feb. 1, 
2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/02/01/cfpb-mick-mulvaney-lending 
-housing-discrimination. Patrice Ficklin, the Assistant Director of OFLEO, unsuc-
cessfully fought the transfer. See Bureau Structure, CFPB, https://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure (last visited Apr. 
12, 2019). 
 225. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(c)(2)(A) (2012); see Minority Staff Report, supra note 
155, at 8; Letter from Sherrod Brown, Senator, et al., to Leandra English & 
Mick Mulvaney (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.brown.senate.gov/download/ 
banking-21618 (noting this requirement). 
 226. Lev et al., supra note 219. 
 227. Melanie Brody et al., An Uncertain Future for Fair Lending Enforce-
ment at CFPB, LAW360 (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.law360.com/banking/ 
articles/1016676. 
 228. See Minority Staff Report, supra note 155, at 9–10. 
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involvement in examinations.229 Eventually Mr. Frotman re-
signed in protest, in part due to that action.230 
Together, Mr. Mulvaney’s actions to sabotage CFPB super-
vision were aimed at toppling one of the key pillars of the Bu-
reau. To exacerbate matters, a number of those actions were of 
questionable legality. His decision to strip the fair lending office 
of its supervisory duties countermanded Dodd-Frank’s provision 
charging OFLEO with oversight of the nation’s fair lending 
laws.231 His order to scrap supervisory examinations for Military 
Lending Act violations proceeded based on a dubious legal anal-
ysis. Meanwhile, Mr. Mulvaney’s proposal to cede CFPB super-
vision powers to federal regulators blatantly violated the Dodd-
Frank Act. Together, these actions exacerbate concerns that Mr. 
Mulvaney was prepared to undermine the Bureau, even if it 
meant defying the law. 
D. ENFORCEMENT 
Supervision and regulation were not the only structural 
footings that Mr. Mulvaney besieged. In addition, he wasted no 
time decimating enforcement. Days after he took office, he con-
vened a meeting to review the CFPB’s most pressing enforce-
ment matters, according to the press.232 After ordering an inter-
nal review of supervision and enforcement, he reportedly 
instructed staff to survey financial firms about the burdens to 
them from CFPB investigations.233 Meanwhile, he broadcast his 
intentions as to enforcement in a memorandum to CFPB staff in 
January 2018, declaring that the CFPB would no longer “push 
the envelope” or look for “excuses to bring lawsuits.”234 Instead, 
Mr. Mulvaney planned on “less regulation by enforcement,” and 
only in cases of “quantifiable and unavoidable harm to the con-
sumer.”235 Later, in a speech to state attorneys general, Mr. Mul-
vaney intimated that the CFPB would refrain from enforcement 
 
 229. See Kate Berry, Mulvaney Guts CFPB’s Student Lending Office, AM. BANKER 
(May 9, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/mulvaney-guts-cfpbs 
-student-lending-office. 
 230. See Frotman Letter, supra note 222. 
 231. See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(c)(2) (2012). 
 232. See Eisinger, supra note 165. 
 233. See id. 
 234. E-mail from Mick Mulvaney, Dir., CFPB, to _DL_CFPB_AllHands (Jan. 
23, 2018, 12:59 CST), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4357880 
-Mulvaney-Memo.html. 
 235. Id. 
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where state officials did not “think it’s against the law” or “think 
it’s in [their] state’s best interest.”236 
In reality, Mr. Mulvaney went even further, by attempting 
to shut down enforcement one part at a time. He used several 
techniques to reduce enforcement to an empty husk. First, ac-
cording to a press account, in a play borrowed from the supervi-
sion book, he threatened to relegate more enforcement to the 
states.237 Second, he brought enforcement to a halt for a pe-
riod.238 Third, when he later resumed bringing enforcement 
cases, he narrowed the grounds and relief in the cases he did 
bring.239 Finally, he relieved OFLEO and the Student Loan Om-
budsman of their enforcement responsibilities. Together, these 
actions sought to disable enforcement from carrying out its re-
sponsibilities for policing major industry sectors and for enforc-
ing important bodies of law. 
1. Halt to New Enforcement Cases 
The most drastic way to undermine enforcement is to bring 
it to a halt. That is what happened once Mr. Mulvaney took over 
the Bureau’s helm. 
Mr. Mulvaney’s initial data freeze had the immediate effect 
of “freezing enforcement.”240 After that, CFPB enforcement col-
lapsed. Between November 2017, when Mr. Mulvaney took of-
fice, and April 2018, the Bureau announced only one new public 
 
 236. Minority Staff Report, supra note 155, at 6 (quoting Mick Mulvaney, 
Remarks before the National Association of Attorneys General (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?441853-4/consumer-financial-protection-bureau 
-acting-director-mick-mulvaney). Mulvaney suggested that the CFPB would 
stay its hand even if more states supported CFPB enforcement action than op-
posed it. See id. at 7. 
 237. See Evan Weinberger, States Face Limits in Stepping Up as CFPB Re-
treats, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.bna.com/states-face 
-limits-n57982091672. 
 238. See infra Part III.D.1. 
 239. In addition, Mr. Mulvaney solicited public comment on whether to 
change the CFPB’s investigation procedures, with the effect of making investi-
gations more difficult. See, e.g., Prentiss Cox, Christopher L. Peterson & Fin. 
Regulation & Consumer Prot. Scholars & Former Regulators, Response Regard-
ing Bureau Civil Investigative Demands and Associated Processes (Docket No. 
CFPB-2018-0001) (Apr. 25, 2018), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cfpb 
-comments/1 (arguing that the CFPB should not change its Civil Investigative 
Demand (CID) processes); May 14, 2018 Comments, supra note 62 (commenting 
that the CFPB needs a strong and independent enforcement program). The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce publicly called for those sorts of changes. See CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE, supra note 61, at 6, 18–19. 
 240. See Eisinger, supra note 165. 
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enforcement case.241 In contrast, under Mr. Cordray, CFPB en-
forcement had brought an impressive 3.2 new cases on average 
a month between July 2012 and October 2017.242 Adding to the 
standstill, the CFPB under Mr. Mulvaney reportedly cancelled 
other investigations that were underway.243 
The only case that Mr. Mulvaney rolled out in spring 2018 
was against Wells Fargo (for violations involving mortgage rate 
locks and force-placed auto insurance).244 Mr. Mulvaney could 
hardly ignore Wells Fargo’s latest consumer abuses, because 
President Trump had issued a tweet demanding sanctions 
against the company.245 Far from showing that CFPB enforce-
ment remained vigorous under Mr. Mulvaney, the Wells Fargo 
outlier intensified concerns that the White House was calling the 
shots for CFPB enforcement. 
2. Narrower Grounds and Relief in Eventual Enforcement 
Cases 
In spring 2018, the breakdown in enforcement under Mr. 
Mulvaney was so complete that observers aired statistics docu-
menting the extent of that collapse.246 Evidently that shamed 
 
 241. See May 14, 2018 Comments, supra note 62, at 8; see also Cox et al., 
supra note 56, at 80 (discussing an empirical study of CFPB enforcement cases 
in 2014). In addition, at least one CFPB investigation was terminated and a 
CFPB lawsuit was withdrawn soon after Mr. Mulvaney assumed control, under 
circumstances raising concerns about conflicts of interest. See Eisinger, supra 
note 165. The agency halted an investigation into an installment lender that 
had given him political contributions when he was a congressman. See id.; Re-
nae Merle, ‘The Fish Rots from the Head Down’; Former Consumer Protection 
Bureau Chief Fires Back at Trump Successor, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/01/24/the-fish-rots 
-from-the-head-down-former-consumer-protection-bureau-chief-fires-back-at 
-trump-successor. Meanwhile, CFPB attorneys withdrew a pending enforce-
ment action against payday lenders for no stated reason, after Mr. Mulvaney’s 
reported intervention. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 
41(a)(1)(A)(i), CFPB v. Golden Valley Lending, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-02521-JAR-JPO 
(D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2018); see Eisinger, supra note 165. 
 242. See May 14, 2018 Comments, supra note 62, at 8. 
 243. See, e.g., Minority Staff Report, supra note 155, at 7. But see Lev et al., 
supra note 219 (discussing signs of newly initiated CFPB investigations). 
 244. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Announces Settlement with 
Wells Fargo for Auto-Loan Administration and Mortgage Practices, CFPB (Apr. 
20, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau 
-consumer-financial-protection-announces-settlement-wells-fargo-auto-loan 
-administration-and-mortgage-practices. 
 245. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2017, 7:18 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/939152197090148352. 
 246. See, e.g., May 14, 2018 Comments, supra note 62. 
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the Bureau into bringing a few new enforcement actions soon 
afterwards. From May 2018 through October 2018, the CFPB 
announced nine new enforcement actions.247 However, the terms 
and conditions in those consent orders were suggestive of a rush 
to settle248 and were noticeably weaker than the typical terms 
and conditions in the Bureau’s enforcement orders under Mr. 
Cordray.249  
For example, in the Wells Fargo consent order under Mr. 
Mulvaney, the Bureau allowed Wells Fargo to determine how 
much restitution it would pay and which consumers would be 
eligible for payments, subject to the Bureau’s review.250 The Mul-
vaney consent order further allowed Wells Fargo to restrict relief 
to “economic and cognizable harm.”251 
An industry newsletter later applauded the CFPB’s consent 
orders in mid-2018 for their “minimal financial penalties.”252 Re-
portedly, CFPB staff referred to these disappointing penalties as 
the “Mulvaney Discount.”253 In a payday lending case against 
the Hydra Group, for instance, the CFPB only assessed a $1 civil 
money penalty and suspended a $69 million jury award for con-
sumer redress, supposedly due to the respondents’ limited abil-
ity to pay.254 (The payday industry was the same industry that 
 
 247. Compilation by author of enforcement statistics from the CFPB web-
site. CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). Ac-
cording to a former CFPB enforcement attorney, most or all of the actions were 
carryovers from the Cordray period. 
 248. See Eisinger, supra note 165. 
 249. See May 14, 2018 Comments, supra note 62, at 12 n.25 (comparing con-
sent order terms imposed under Mr. Cordray with those imposed under Mr. 
Mulvaney). 
 250. See In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ¶¶ 49–58, CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0001 
(consent order) (Apr. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Wells Fargo Consent Order], 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_wells-fargo-bank-na_ 
consent-order_2018-04.pdf; May 14, 2018 Comments, supra note 62, at 12–13. 
 251. See Wells Fargo Consent Order, supra note 250, at ¶¶ 51, 56. 
 252. Richard E. Gottlieb & Charles E. Washburn, Jr., CFPB News: New In-
novations Office, ‘Gentler’ Consent Orders, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 2, 2018), https:// 
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d974e5a9-af89-45b7-8ff5-be80686d27 
a6. 
 253. Robert O’Harrow, Jr. et al., How Trump Appointees Curbed a Consumer 
Protection Agency Loathed by the GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-trump-appointees-curbed-a 
-consumer-protection-agency-loathed-by-the-gop/2018/12/04/3cb6cd56-de20 
-11e8-aa33-53bad9a881e8_story.html. 
 254. See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Settles with Defendants 
in Hydra Group Payday Lending Case, CFPB (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-consumer-financial 
-protection-settles-defendants-hydra-group-payday-lending-case. 
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had contributed to Mr. Mulvaney as congressman).255 Another 
CFPB settlement suspended a $1,522,298 judgment against the 
auto title lender Triton Management Group on the condition 
that it pay $500,000 to injured consumers.256 A third CFPB or-
der, this one involving debt collectors National Credit Adjusters, 
LLC and Bradley Hochstein, slashed the total civil money pen-
alties against the respondents from $6 million to $800,000 on 
condition of payment.257 On another occasion, the CFPB under 
Mr. Mulvaney declined to levy a civil money penalty in a consent 
order requiring Citibank, N.A., to pay $335 million in restitution 
to consumers for not properly evaluating adjustments to annual 
percentage rates on credit card accounts.258 The opposite pattern 
appeared in a settlement with debt collectors Security Group, 
Inc., and Security Finance Corporation, which assessed a civil 
money penalty but ordered no financial relief to affected consum-
ers, even though the respondents had physically blocked some of 
those consumers from leaving their homes.259 Some of the 2018 
enforcement cases did find UDAAP violations,260 but the major-
ity of those cases limited their UDAAP theories to the term “de-
ceptive” and did not cite respondents for unfair or abusive acts 
or practices.261 Meanwhile, as of this writing, the CFPB still has 
 
 255. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 256. See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Settles with Triton Man-
agement Group, CFPB (July 19, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about 
-us/newsroom/bureau-consumer-financial-protection-settles-triton 
-management-group. 
 257. See Bureau Settles with National Credit Adjusters, LLC and Bradley 
Hochstein, CFPB (July 13, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/ 
newsroom/bureau-settles-national-credit-adjusters-llc-and-bradley-hochstein. 
Originally, the CFPB’s enforcement attorneys had sought $60 million in con-
sumer relief in the National Credit Adjusters case. See O’Harrow, supra note 
253. 
 258. See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Settles with Citibank, 
N.A., CFPB (June 29, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/ 
newsroom/bureau-consumer-financial-protection-settles-citibank-na. 
 259. See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Settles with Security 
Group, Inc., CFPB (June 13, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/ 
newsroom/bureau-consumer-financial-protection-settles-security-group-inc. 
 260. One set of observers remarked that under Mr. Mulvaney, “UDAAP 
claims . . . continued to be the bread and butter of enforcement.” Lev et al., su-
pra note 219. Of the nine cases brought by Mr. Mulvaney, eight included 
UDAAP claims, and five rested solely on UDAAP. 
 261. Analysis by author. One exception was the Security Group case, which 
did find specific debt collection practices “unfair.” See In re Sec. Grp., Inc. ¶¶ 13, 
23, 32, 40, CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0002 (consent order) (June 12, 2018). In an-
other debt collection case, the Bureau found the alleged practices “deceptive” 
and “abusive.” See In re Cash Express, LLC ¶¶ 18, 24, 38, CFPB No. 2018-
BCFP-0007 (consent order) (Oct. 23, 2018). Finally, in Bluestem Brands, Inc., 
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not taken enforcement action against Equifax for the data secu-
rity breach that exposed the personal information of 143 million 
consumers.262 
3. Excising the Fair Lending and Student Loan Offices from 
Enforcement 
Mr. Mulvaney’s decisions to transfer the fair lending and 
student loan offices out of SEFL had another detrimental effect, 
by stripping both offices of their enforcement powers.263 The 
move left enforcement in both areas in shambles.264 According to 
Seth Frotman, the former CFPB Assistant Director and Student 
Loan Ombudsman, Mr. Mulvaney “[u]ndercut[] enforcement of 
the law” guarding student borrowers, while “protect[ing] the in-
terests of the biggest financial companies in America.”265 Mr. 
Frotman further charged Mr. Mulvaney with “political interfer-
ence” in a CFPB investigation of Navient, the biggest U.S. stu-
dent loan servicer.266 Meanwhile, under Mr. Mulvaney, the Bu-
reau announced a broadside attack on fair lending enforcement 
in the form of plans to revisit the disparate impact theory used 
to prove Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) lending discrim-
ination cases.267  
In sum, in a now familiar pattern, Mr. Mulvaney bogged 
down CFPB enforcement any way he could. He froze personally 
identifiable information needed for CFPB enforcement attorneys 
 
the Bureau termed the alleged debt collection and debt sales practices “unfair.” 
In re Bluestem Brands, Inc. ¶ 27, CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0006 (consent order) 
(Oct. 2, 2018). See Lev et al., supra note 219, for a discussion of enforcement 
trends under Mr. Mulvaney. 
 262. See Eisinger, supra note 165. 
 263. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 264. Brody et al., supra note 227. 
 265. Frotman Letter, supra note 222, at 2. 
 266. Glenn Thrush, After Scaling Back Student Loan Regulations, Admin-
istration Tries to Stop State Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/us/politics/devos-student-loans.html; see also Stacy 
Cowley, How a Potential $1 Billion Student Loan Settlement Collapsed After 
Trump Won, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/ 
business/student-loans-navient.html (explaining how the CFPB’s settlement 
talks with Navient broke down); Eisinger, supra note 165. 
 267. See Berry, CFPB’s Mulvaney, supra note 184; Kelly Cochran, Fall 2018 
Rulemaking Agenda, CFPB (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/blog/fall-2018-rulemaking-agenda; Evan Weinberger, CFPB to Review 
Use of Disparate Impact in Fair Lending Cases, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 21, 
2018), https://www.bna.com/cfpb-review-disparate-n57982092803. The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce specifically had urged Mr. Mulvaney to abolish the dis-
parate impact theory. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 61, at 4. 
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to prove their cases. He stopped new enforcement actions alto-
gether for a while, then rushed a handful of investigations to 
seemingly hasty settlements with light or non-existent monetary 
relief. He cut enforcement for unfair or abusive acts or practices. 
He restructured the agency to strip the fair lending and student 
loan offices of enforcement authority.268 To boot, disparate im-
pact analysis for ECOA discrimination cases is now on the chop-
ping block.  
*** 
With the advent of the Trump Administration, the con-
stantly embattled CFPB became the target of open warfare. That 
war was waged on all three fronts, in the legislative, judicial, and 
executive branches. The immediate goal of that campaign was 
less to repeal specific policies than to bring down the structure 
that had made the Bureau under Richard Cordray so effective. 
In 2017 and 2018, Congress made no significant headway in 
that structural attack. The judicial challenges are more of a 
threat, but the Bureau under Mr. Mulvaney opposed one such 
challenge and the outcome remains to be seen. Due to their lack 
of success in the courts and in Congress, the CFPB’s opponents 
then turned to the White House and its appointee, OMB Director 
Mick Mulvaney, to debilitate the Bureau from within. 
Mr. Mulvaney proceeded to sabotage the core functions of 
the Bureau, sometimes in diabolically clever ways. By blocking 
the Bureau’s use of qualitative data and disabling it from ana-
lyzing consumer issues using large data sets due to supposed pri-
vacy or data security concerns, he immobilized rulemaking, su-
pervision and enforcement and deprived the Bureau of the 
evidentiary basis to redress serious consumer harms.269 Impair-
ing the Bureau’s access to qualitative and quantitative data also 
created a Catch-22 by preventing the Bureau from performing 
the kind of cost-benefit studies that Mr. Mulvaney demanded. 
When data flows resumed, he blocked the expansion of HMDA 
data and rigged the cost-benefit analysis process in other ways 
to shift rulemaking outcomes to favor industry.270 Meanwhile, he 
refused to implement some of Mr. Cordray’s final rules. 
Mr. Mulvaney defanged supervision and enforcement in ad-
ditional ways. He watered down or eliminated consumer compli-
ance examinations for MLA and UDAAP violations.271 Initially, 
 
 268. See also supra Part III.C.3. 
 269. See supra Part III.A. 
 270. See supra Part III.A–B. 
 271. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
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he halted enforcement, but later issued a handful of enforcement 
decisions with minimal monetary relief after encountering criti-
cism.272 Meanwhile, Mr. Mulvaney acted aggressively to flat line 
supervision and enforcement for fair lending and student debt. 
The good news is that the CFPB is still in operation. The bad 
news is that the Bureau has sustained damage, some of it seri-
ous, from the Trump Administration’s unending attacks on its 
foundation. Without a doubt, the experience under the Trump 
Administration and Mr. Mulvaney put the CFPB’s structure to 
the ultimate test. 
IV.  WILL THE STRUCTURE HOLD UP?   
The events of 2017 and 2018 raise the questions: Will the 
CFPB’s structure survive? Will consumer financial protection 
live to fight another day? Or will the attacks on the structure of 
the Bureau permanently hobble market conduct regulation of 
consumer finance? 
In a democracy, periodic swings between pro-regulatory and 
deregulatory forces are inevitable. Elections have consequences 
and Presidents appoint CFPB Directors. Changes in Administra-
tions will periodically consign the Bureau to inaction and rever-
sal of at least some of its prior substantive policies. 
Nevertheless, so far it appears that most of the effects of the 
Bureau’s current retrenchment will be temporary. To be sure, 
consumers who suffer harm from financial products or services 
during this period will not be able to look to the CFPB for re-
dress.273 And some Cordray-era policies, if they are reversed, will 
take longer to reinstate than others.274 However, the Bureau’s 
core statutory authorities remain untouched and are available 
to reactivate when the electoral pendulum swings back.275 In the 
interim, there are alternative sources of consumer financial pro-
tection that can partly fill the gap left by the Bureau’s immobili-
zation. Bottom line, the Bureau’s structure, while bloodied, will 
probably survive the onslaught of the last two years. 
Three caveats, however, are in order regarding the long-
term health of consumer financial protection. First, if any of the 
 
 272. See supra notes 240–62 and accompanying text. 
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 274. See infra Part IV.B. 
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pending constitutional challenges276 is ultimately successful, it 
could deal a lethal blow to the Bureau’s effectiveness. Second, 
this analysis assumes that the CFPB’s mortgage rules and over-
sight under Trump appointees remain strong enough to avoid a 
repeat of the 2008 financial crisis.277 If that assumption proves 
wrong, the repercussions of another global financial meltdown 
could be devastating to consumers. Finally, this analysis as-
sumes that transgressions of the laws protecting the CFPB by 
Mr. Mulvaney or his successor will be rebuffed. If, on the other 
hand, the laws underpinning the CFPB’s edifice are under-
mined, then the Bureau’s structure will be jeopardized.  
In the remainder of this Section, I examine the effects of the 
current structural assault on key elements of the CFPB’s archi-
tecture, starting with the leadership model of the Bureau. 
A. SINGLE-DIRECTOR MODEL 
The single-Director structure, combined with for-cause pro-
tection from firing, is the most controversial aspect of the CFPB’s 
design. The first seven years of the Bureau’s existence high-
lighted the advantages and disadvantages of that design choice, 
in comparison to a bipartisan commission model.  
This debate joined issue in the PHH case, where critics ar-
gued that the CFPB Director, as a single agency head, wields 
excessive and arbitrary power.278 This criticism is badly exagger-
ated. It ignores the fact that other federal independent agencies 
are led by a single head.279 Further, the argument mistakenly 
asserts that the Director answers to no one. In fact, the Director 
and the agency at large are politically accountable to Congress 
 
 276. See supra Part II.B. 
 277. Residential mortgages are the one product overseen the by CFPB that 
poses systemic risk. See Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its 
Challenges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 1185–86 (2015) (discussing the “boom-and-
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 278. See Opening Brief for Petitioners at 45, PHH Corp. v. CFPB, No. 15-
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tive, and judicial power all ‘in the same hands’ of a single person[, the Director,] 
who is entirely unaccountable to the democratic process . . . [which is] ‘the very 
definition of tyranny.’”). 
 279. See Brief on Rehearing En Banc of Amici Curiae Financial Regulation 
Scholars in Support of Respondent 3, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 2017) 
(“Some agencies are headed by a single director, while others are led by multi-
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rity Administration (SSA), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
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and the public in myriad ways. Under Dodd-Frank, the Director 
must submit semi-annual reports to the House and Senate bank-
ing committees and testify before those committees at least twice 
a year.280 In reality, the Director and senior CFPB officials tes-
tify before Congress much more frequently than that.281 The Di-
rector and the Bureau’s employees also respond to document re-
quests by congressional committees on a regular basis and can 
face congressional subpoenas. On the fiscal side, Congress 
capped the Bureau’s budget in Dodd-Frank282 and inflation is 
likely to cause the real value of the CFPB’s budget to shrink over 
time.283 
Congress is not the only body with purview of the Bureau. 
The Inspector General of the Federal Reserve System oversees 
the Bureau284 and the Comptroller General audits it annually.285 
The General Accountability Office has issued numerous over-
sight reports evaluating the CFPB’s policy decisions and opera-
tions.286 In another check, members of the public and the press 
regularly obtain and publicize internal documents from the Bu-
reau using Freedom of Information Act requests.287 
Similarly, the Bureau’s rulemaking is held in check in nu-
merous ways. As already discussed,288 CFPB rules are subject to 
substantial public input and transparency under the notice-and-
comment protections of the APA. Unusually, rulemakings by the 
Bureau must also undergo OMB reviews under the Small Busi-
ness Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA) 
 
 280. See 12 U.S.C. § 5496 (2012).  
 281. See Newsroom, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/ 
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 282. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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vestigation, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://epic.org/ 
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(one of only three agencies that must submit to those reviews).289 
Once they are promulgated, the Bureau’s rules are subject to ju-
dicial review.290 In an unprecedented provision, Congress also 
gave the Financial Stability Oversight Council the power to veto 
any CFPB rule that would jeopardize the financial stability of 
the United States.291 Separately, Congress can overturn CFPB 
rules by repealing them outright or nullifying them under the 
Congressional Review Act.292 
In sum, there are ample checks and balances on the Direc-
tor’s exercise of authority. Some of those checks and balances are 
extraordinary in nature. Accordingly, the real drawback of the 
single Director structure is not its power. Rather, it is that a 
turnover in Directors after the White House changes parties can 
result in more drastic policy swings compared to a bipartisan 
commission. This volatility is a problem not just for consumers, 
but also for industry participants that have invested substantial 
sums in implementation.  
Yet the volatility of the single Director format is also its 
strength. A single Director can generate more momentum for 
change and accomplish more in a given time period than a bipar-
tisan commission. In all likelihood, this is why both parties 
ended up embracing the single Director format. From 2012 
through 2017, when the pro-consumer Director Cordray was in 
office, the CFPB was able to institute an impressive number of 
strong consumer protections, probably more than a bipartisan 
commission would have accomplished. Assuming that those safe-
guards survive, they will lay the foundation for a healthy retail 
financial services market for years to come, as I now discuss.  
B. THE TRIAD OF REGULATION, SUPERVISION AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
In the Financial CHOICE Act bill, the Republican leader-
ship proposed taking away the CFPB’s supervision powers and 
reducing the Bureau to an enforcement agency. With that bill’s 
 
 289. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1966, Pub. 
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demise, however, the Bureau retained all three of its core regu-
latory powers: regulation, supervision, and enforcement. Now 
that the Democrats took back the House of Representatives in 
the mid-year 2018 elections, Congress is unlikely to take those 
powers away. 
Similarly, the vast bulk of the CFPB’s statutory mandates 
remain in force, with any amendments requiring an act of Con-
gress. Even during 2017 and 2018, when the Republican party 
controlled both houses of Congress and the White House, Con-
gress was not able to amend any of the federal consumer finan-
cial laws or the Bureau’s organic powers, except around the 
edges,293 due to the filibuster threat. All of the financial con-
sumer financial laws are still on the books, the ability-to-repay 
rule for mortgages remains intact, and the Bureau’s UDAAP 
powers survived repeal.  
As a result, any dilution of the Bureau’s statutory powers or 
its substantive mandates will most likely be the product of ad-
ministrative action at the Bureau. The Bureau can implement 
substantive policies through regulation, supervision, or enforce-
ment, but some policies will be easier to reverse than others, de-
pending on which channel is used.294 In that respect, there is an 
inverse relationship between the ease of change and the perma-
nence of any changes. The harder a policy is to reverse, the more 
long-lasting that change may be. Conversely, the faster the 
change, the more easily a successor Director can reverse a policy 
shift. 
In particular, the Cordray-era rulemakings will be slow and 
cumbersome to reverse. Even a fast rulemaking takes a year or 
more, due to the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA, 
the SBREFA review panel process, and the need for a cost-bene-
fit analysis. After the judiciary forced Mr. Mulvaney to initiate 
those procedures for any major rulemakings he wished to 
amend, his rulemaking initiatives slowed down.295 
Other rulemaking dynamics, some mandated by statute, 
also slow down radical amendments. The transparency of rule-
making procedures allows public opposition to coalesce against 
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the most extreme of proposed changes.296 And regulated firms 
may have their own reasons to oppose wholesale changes to ex-
isting rules. Now that industry has invested substantial 
amounts of sunk costs in implementing the older, pre-2016 rules, 
it may not welcome costly changes. (This may partly explain Mr. 
Mulvaney’s focus on rules that had not yet been implemented.) 
Reputable providers may also benefit from a fairer marketplace 
where dishonest firms are unable to out-compete them. Mean-
while, efforts to overhaul rules that were statutorily mandated 
by Congress offer fewer payoffs, since those rules cannot be re-
versed in their entirety without repealing the underlying stat-
utes.  
The cost-benefit analysis requirement also complicates ef-
forts at reversal. Under Richard Cordray, the CFPB conducted 
voluminous, time-consuming studies that provided empirical 
support for the cost-benefit analyses in its later rules. As a re-
sult, the Cordray-era rulemakings were based on a deep eviden-
tiary foundation. The Bureau assembled such a strong factual 
record for those rules that not one of those rules was successfully 
challenged in court for lack of evidence. 
Despite Mr. Mulvaney’s attempt to slant the cost-benefit 
analysis process, he still faced a major hurdle. Given the exten-
sive empirical evidence justifying the original rules, the Bureau 
would face an uphill struggle if it sought to overturn any of those 
rules as unfounded in fact. To succeed, the Bureau would have 
to refute its own prior cost-benefit analysis with even stronger 
empirical evidence. Given the lack of evidence of changed cir-
cumstances and the rules’ success to date in safeguarding con-
sumers, that would not be easy. 
Any drastic revisions to the existing rules would invite a 
court challenge to the rulemakings as arbitrary and capri-
cious.297 In that litigation, the Bureau would find itself in the 
uncomfortable position of defending a 180-degree turnabout on 
the facts when the rule in question had only been in effect for 
five years or less. Accordingly, we may see scenarios such as the 
latest proposed amendment to the payday rule, where the Bu-
reau is still considering intervening in the payday loan market, 
 
 296. The notice and comment requirement, under the APA, requires an 
agency to “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule mak-
ing through submission of written data, views, or arguments.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 297. Section 706(2)(A) of the APA states that courts may reverse agency 
rules where they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
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but paring back the type of intervention from an ability-to-repay 
test to lesser consumer protections.298 This would enable new 
leadership to relax payday regulation while relying on the Bu-
reau’s earlier cost-benefit analysis. 
In short, the Bureau’s rulemakings will be slow and difficult 
to reverse. However, to the extent that rules are amended, those 
changes will be cumbersome for a later Director to overturn.  
Supervision is a different beast altogether. In comparison 
with rulemaking, it is easier for new leadership to slow-walk su-
pervision at the Bureau without being fully detected.299 How-
ever, any supervisory slowdown will be easy to reverse once a 
more proactive Director takes office. 
Like supervision, rollbacks to enforcement are easy to insti-
tute and easy to change. Unlike supervision, downturns in en-
forcement are easier to detect. Some combination of the GAO and 
the Inspector General, plus researchers,300 advocates, and the 
press, may hold the CFPB accountable for the slow pace of CFPB 
enforcement and the weakness of enforcement orders’ terms. 
Some consumer finance scandals, such as Wells Fargo, are so 
egregious that they demand a response. Accordingly, it is possi-
ble to generate public pushback against a cessation of CFPB en-
forcement, which is harder to do for supervision.  
Together, the dynamics I just described militate against a 
permanent collapse of consumer financial protection. In the in-
terim, however, make no mistake, there is real and lasting harm 
to today’s consumers from the CFPB’s slowdown and pandering 
to industry interests. Thankfully, the CFPB does not have a 
stranglehold on consumer financial protection because Congress 
 
 298. See Public Statement Regarding Payday Rule Reconsideration and De-
lay of Compliance Date, supra note 199; Lev et al., supra note 219. 
 299. Even so, there are limits on how far that leadership can go in curtailing 
supervision. Because the CFPB has a statutory duty to supervise, it cannot ab-
dicate its supervisory powers or give them away to the federal prudential bank-
ing regulators or to the states. Any sustained attempt to do that or to bring 
CFPB examinations to a halt would eventually attract the attention of GAO, 
the Inspector General, and, through them, the press and general public. See, 
e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
2013-AE-C-201, THE CFPB SHOULD REASSESS ITS APPROACH TO INTEGRATING 
ENFORCEMENT ATTORNEYS INTO EXAMINATIONS AND ENHANCE ASSOCIATED 
SAFEGUARDS (2013), https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/CFPB_ 
Enforcement_Attorneys_Examinations_full_Dec2013.pdf; U.S. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-278, NONBANK MORTGAGE SERVICERS: EXIST-
ING REGULATORY OVERSIGHT COULD BE STRENGTHENED (2016), https://www 
.gao.gov/assets/680/675747.pdf. 
 300. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 221, at 2–5 (criticizing Mr. Mulvaney’s 
refusal to authorize examinations for violations of the Military Lending Act). 
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built redundancy into the system. There are other potential av-
enues of consumer relief if the CFPB goes dark.301 
C. REDUNDANT DESIGN 
When Congress revamped federal consumer financial pro-
tection in 2010, it incorporated a number of fail-safes and pre-
served others in case the CFPB became moribund. These redun-
dant design features supplement each of the three core 
regulatory functions of the CFPB—rulemaking, supervision, and 
enforcement—in case any of those functions shuts down. 
1. Rulemaking 
If the CFPB stops issuing new rules that are needed to pre-
vent consumer harms, there are three alternative sources of 
law—one state and two federal—that can step into the breach. 
Dodd-Frank’s provision preserving the authority of the 
states to enact consumer financial laws that exceed federal pro-
tections (so long as those laws are consistent)302 provides one im-
portant safeguard for consumers if CFPB rulemaking recedes. 
This state power has maximum effect when it comes to nonbank 
financial services providers, because three doctrines limit state 
power over depository institutions. First, federal preemption 
continues to allow national banks and federal savings associa-
tions to escape many state consumer safeguards in real estate 
lending.303 Second, the Marquette holding allows national banks 
to export any higher usury caps in the states where they are lo-
cated to borrowers living in other states.304 Finally, wild card 
statutes in nearly every state extend the benefits of federal 
 
 301. From a broader perspective, the CFPB’s recent retrenchment naturally 
raises questions about the wisdom of consolidating lead responsibility for mar-
ket conduct risk in the Bureau, similar to a twin peaks model. If the CFPB ab-
dicates its responsibilities—as happened under Mr. Mulvaney’s leadership—we 
need to ask whether consumer financial protection will fall into a regulatory 
void. The federalist model of consumer financial protection helps guard against 
that. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text. Meanwhile, the twin 
peaks structure continues to alleviate other harmful pressures that have exac-
erbated imprudent deregulation in the past. The twin peaks model takes previ-
ous built-in conflicts, such as bank solvency regulation, off of the CFPB’s plate. 
See supra notes 30–53 and accompanying text. It also relieves the Bureau from 
pressure to relax regulation even further, because the agency does not have to 
compete for charters. See supra Part I.B.  
 302. See supra Part I.F. 
 303. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 304. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 
439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978); see McCoy & Renuart, supra note 17, at 114. 
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preemption to state-chartered depository institutions in order to 
give them parity with federally chartered institutions.305  
As a result of these carve outs for depository institutions, 
nonbank providers are the most frequent objects of state con-
sumer financial laws. Even in the case of nonbank providers, 
however, state laws do not offer nationwide protection because 
some states have weaker laws than others. Nonbank providers 
doing business in states with strong consumer protections, how-
ever, have to observe those laws. On top of that, all states pro-
hibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices in consumer credit,306 
which provides another layer of protection. 
At the federal level, there are two potential stopgaps to a 
cutback in CFPB rulemaking. To some extent, the federal pru-
dential banking regulators can address consumer finance abuses 
that jeopardize the solvency of insured depository institutions 
and their subsidiaries307 through safety-and-soundness rules or 
guidances, if they so choose. The OCC, for example, issued sev-
eral guidances addressing consumer protection issues that 
might threaten bank safety and soundness in the past few 
years.308 Whether the prudential regulators will do more along 
those lines in the current deregulatory climate is unclear, par-
ticularly given their history of regulatory laxity during the years 
preceding the 2008 financial crisis. Still, those powers are on the 
books and can be used.  
More importantly, the FTC can proscribe unfair and decep-
tive acts and practices (UDAPs) through enforcement and poten-
tially through rulemaking in order to combat consumer harms 
that otherwise might have been addressed by CFPB rules.309 The 
 
 305. See, e.g., Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, Is There a Dual Banking Sys-
tem?, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 30, 34, 64–71 (2008); Christian John-
son, Wild Card Statutes, Parity, and National Banks—The Renascence of State 
Banking Powers, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 368 (1995). 
 306. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 
STATES 9 (2018), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf. This re-
port documented substantial variation, however, in the strength of these state 
laws. Id. at 1. 
 307. In addition, the Federal Reserve Board exercises oversight of bank hold-
ing companies and their subsidiaries—including nonbank consumer finance af-
filiates—for safety and soundness. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)–(c)(2) (2012) (au-
thorizing the Board’s supervision of bank holding companies and their 
subsidiaries). 
 308. See Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller, OCC, Remarks at the Consumer 
Federation of America’s Financial Services Conference 17–19 (Dec. 6, 2013) 
[hereinafter Curry Remarks], https://www2.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/ 
2013/pub-speech-2013-185.pdf.  
 309. The FTC has authority to prohibit UDAPs under the Federal Trade 
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federal prudential regulators also play a role in UDAP oversight. 
While they no longer have rulemaking authority to define 
UDAPs,310 the prudential regulators issued an interagency guid-
ance in 2014 stating that practices by depository institutions 
that were prohibited by the regulators’ previous credit practices 
rules might violate the prohibition against UDAPs in the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act and the Dodd-Frank Act.311 To-
gether, the FTC and the prudential regulators cover virtually all 
bank and nonbank providers nationwide, which makes their 
UDAP powers an important potential antidote to rulemaking pa-
ralysis at the Bureau. 
In sum, state consumer financial laws, federal safety-and-
soundness rules for depository institutions, and UDAP laws at 
the state and federal levels provide a back-up if CFPB rulemak-
ing grinds to a halt. Those laws vary in strength, purpose, and 
coverage, meaning that the back-up is only partial. Neverthe-
less, some states and agencies are already invoking those laws 
to address consumer violations,312 protecting consumers in the 
process and applying pressure to the CFPB as well. 
 
Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); see id. § 57a; FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATIVE AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/ 
enforcement-authority. As a practical matter, due to the strictures in the Mag-
nuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Commission has developed its UDAP doctrine 
through enforcement and not through rules. See supra notes 86–91 and accom-
panying text. 
 310. In Section 1092(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act (amending 15 U.S.C. § 
57a(f ) ), Congress repealed their authority to write rules implementing the 
UDAP provisions in the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
1092(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2095. The FTC does have that rulemaking power but 
does not use it as a practical matter. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.  
 311. OCC, OCC BULL. NO. 2014-42, CREDIT PRACTICE RULES (2014), https:// 
www2.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2014/bulletin-2014-42.html. 
 312. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Mass. Attorney Gen. Maura Healey, 
Federal Judge Denies Motion from For-profit School Industry to Delay Critical 
Protections for Student Loan Borrowers (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.mass.gov/ 
news/federal-judge-denies-motion-from-for-profit-school-industry-to-delay 
-critical-protections-for; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., Responding to Widespread Consumer Abuses and Compliance Break-
downs by Wells Fargo, Federal Reserve Restricts Wells’ Growth Until Firm Im-
proves Governance and Controls. Concurrent with Fed Action, Wells to Replace 
Three Directors by April, One by Year End (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www 
.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/enforcement20180202a.htm. 
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2. Supervision 
To some degree, Congress also built redundancy into super-
vision for consumer compliance. This is most noticeable in the 
case of depository institutions. The federal prudential banking 
regulators and, where appropriate, state banking regulators ex-
amine consumer practices by banks, thrifts, and credit unions 
for safety-and-soundness concerns.313 The federal prudential 
regulators also examine depository institutions for federal 
UDAP violations and compliance with certain other consumer 
protection laws, including the Fair Housing Act, the Service-
members Civil Relief Act and the Community Reinvestment 
Act.314  
The prudential regulators’ overlapping supervision is espe-
cially important when it comes to banks, thrifts, and credit un-
ions with more than $10 billion in assets, because the Bureau 
has exclusive supervisory power over those institutions for com-
pliance with the federal consumer financial laws.315 While par-
allel examinations by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the OCC, 
and the NCUA do not look at the identical issues as CFPB ex-
aminations, there is meaningful overlap. Meanwhile, the federal 
prudential banking regulators continue to serve as the primary 
supervisors of smaller depository institutions and credit unions 
 
 313. See, e.g., Curry Remarks, supra note 308, at 15 (“In reality, there is no 
neat dividing line between consumer compliance and safety and soundness is-
sues.”); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 5515(b)(2)–(b)(3), (e) (2012) (requiring the CFPB to coor-
dinate with safety and soundness examinations and to use reports from those 
examinations where relevant). State banking regulators also examine state-
chartered banks, thrifts, and credit unions for consumer compliance. 
 314. See OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GEN., FDIC OIG REP. NO. EVAL-15-004, 
VARIOUS FEDERAL AGENCIES, COORDINATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AND THE PRUDENTIAL REGULA-
TORS—LIMITED SCOPE REVIEW 2–3, 13–15 (2015), https://www.fdicoig.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/15-004EV.pdf; Curry Remarks, supra note 308, at  
14–15. 
 315. In reality, the CFPB’s exclusive supervisory jurisdiction is larger than 
this. Under Dodd-Frank and a 2012 Memorandum of Understanding among the 
CFPB and the federal prudential banking regulators, the CFPB also supervises 
insured depository institutions with $10 billion or less in total assets for com-
pliance with the federal consumer financial laws any time those institutions are 
affiliates of an insured depository institution with total assets exceeding $10 
billion. See Memorandum of Understanding on Supervisory Coordination Be-
tween the CFPB and Prudential Regulators 3 n.4 (May 16, 2012), https://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/implementation-guidance/ 
mou-supervisory-coordination; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a) (authorizing the 
CFPB to supervise depository institutions with more than $10 billion in assets 
as well as those institutions’ affiliates). 
  
2019] INSIDE JOB 2611 
 
for consumer compliance, so any lapse in CFPB oversight does 
not affect them.316 
Any abdication by the CFPB of its exclusive federal supervi-
sory responsibilities for nonbanks would be more problematic. 
Because the FTC lacks routine examination power over non-
banks, there is no federal agency other than the CFPB that ex-
amines nonbanks for consumer compliance. However, there are 
pockets of other supervisory authority over nonbank financial 
firms.  
For example, each appropriate federal prudential banking 
regulator conducts safety and soundness examinations of the 
nonbank subsidiaries of insured depository institutions under its 
watch.317 Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board examines non-
bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies for safety and 
soundness.318 At the state level, some independent nonbank fi-
nancial providers undergo consumer compliance examinations, 
depending on the state.319 State jurisdiction over independent 
nonbank providers is spotty, so some nonbank firms elude exam-
ination entirely. Nevertheless, the existing pockets of supervi-
sion could partly close the gap if CFPB supervision of nonbanks 
faltered. 
In sum, if the CFPB defaults, there is a partial safety net for 
the entire banking industry because federal and state prudential 
banking regulators examine all depository institutions, credit 
unions, and their affiliates for solvency and sometimes consumer 
protection. Supervisory jurisdiction over nonbanks is less com-
plete, but other agencies bring supervisory scrutiny to bear on 
those providers in many cases. 
3. Enforcement 
Dodd-Frank’s redundant design is most apparent when it 
comes to CFPB enforcement. Under Dodd-Frank, state attorneys 
general can sue bank and nonbank providers alike to enforce Ti-
tle X of Dodd-Frank and accompanying CFPB rules.320 Obvi-
ously, the strength of state enforcement will depend on a given 
 
 316. See 12 U.S.C. § 5516(a)–(c). 
 317. See McCoy & Renuart, supra note 17, at 128 tbl.4-1. 
 318. See id. at 128 tbl.4-1. 
 319. See id. 
 320. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1). The one exception is in the case of national banks 
and federal savings associations, which state attorneys general may only sue to 
enforce CFPB rules implementing Title X. Id. § 5552(a)(2). Meanwhile, Dodd-
Frank also empowered state regulators to “bring a civil action or other appro-
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state’s attorney general and his or her enforcement philosophy, 
priorities, and willingness to litigate in federal court. Neverthe-
less, vigorous enforcement by one state can protect that state’s 
citizens while pressuring the CFPB to act. On top of this, state 
attorneys general and state banking regulators retain their cus-
tomary authority to enforce state consumer financial laws. 
There is also substantial overlap in federal enforcement. In 
2012, the FTC and the CFPB signed a memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) governing enforcement actions against inde-
pendent nonbanks concerning the offering or provision of con-
sumer financial products or services.321 As a result of that MOU 
and the FTC’s independent authority for enforcing the UDAP 
provisions in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the 
Commission remains a potent enforcement authority against 
freestanding nonbank providers. Separately, the federal pruden-
tial banking regulators retain consumer compliance enforcement 
authority against the overwhelming bulk of banks, thrifts, and 
credit unions (those with total assets of $10 billion or less).322 
The prudential regulators also have ample authority to bring 
other types of enforcement actions against insured depository in-
stitutions and their affiliates of any size. These include actions 
for safety-and-soundness violations involving consumer prod-
ucts or services as well as for UDAP violations and infractions of 
the other consumer laws that they administer.323 Admittedly, 
the jurisdiction of the federal prudential banking regulators, like 
that of the FTC,324 is not perfectly congruent with the CFPB’s 
substantive authority over the federal consumer financial laws. 
Still, some sort of back-up federal enforcement authority is pos-
sible if the Bureau fails to discharge its enforcement responsibil-
ities adequately. 
Finally, the federal consumer financial laws provide a num-
ber of express private rights of action to consumers who have 
suffered harm.325 While mandatory arbitration clauses, growing 
 
priate proceeding” against state-chartered entities to enforce Title X and its im-
plementing rules. Id. § 5552(a)(1). 
 321. See id. § 5514(c)(3) (requiring the two agencies to negotiate that agree-
ment); CFPB-FTC Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 27. 
 322. 12 U.S.C. § 5516(d)(1). 
 323. See Curry Remarks, supra note 308, at 16; cf. supra notes 315–16 and 
accompanying text (describing supervisory jurisdiction). 
 324. For a list of the laws that the FTC enforces, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
STATUTES ENFORCED OR ADMINISTERED BY THE COMMISSION, https://www 
.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes. 
 325. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f ) (1)–(3); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a), 1681n, 1681o 
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hurdles to class action certification, and prohibitive litigation 
costs discourage individual actions, these causes of action bolster 
enforcement on the margin. 
Bottom line, banks and nonbanks alike face other types of 
potential state and federal enforcement plus possible private 
lawsuits if enforcement lapses at the Bureau. Like the redun-
dancies surrounding CFPB rulemaking and supervision, the 
overlap between CFPB enforcement and other state and federal 
enforcement provides a possible alternative safeguard for con-
sumers if the CFPB continues down the path of deregulation. 
*** 
To conclude, the Bureau’s structural safeguards will proba-
bly survive the Trump Administration intact. Subject to the ca-
veats mentioned above,326 it is unlikely that the CFPB will be 
compromised permanently, allowing it to eventually resume vig-
orous protection of consumers once another sympathetic Direc-
tor takes office. In the short term, however, consumers will suf-
fer real harm due to the Bureau’s inaction. Other state and 
federal actors may take up some of the slack, but those protec-
tions will be piecemeal and invocation is not guaranteed. 
  CONCLUSION   
The inside job at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
is striking for its emphasis on structure. More importantly, this 
story has larger significance for the rule of law. Mr. Mulvaney 
accomplished certain objectives, and floated proposals to accom-
plish others, by ignoring or circumventing legal protections that 
Congress put in place to protect the CFPB’s independence and 
the integrity of the agency’s decisions. Indeed, perhaps to deflect 
criticism on that score, Mr. Mulvaney sought to clothe his own 
actions in the guise of the rule of law, telling Congress: “By struc-
turing the bureau the way it has, Congress established an 
agency primed to ignore due process and abandon the rule of law 
in favor of bureaucratic fiat and administrative absolutism.”327 
 
(2012); B. Rush Smith III, Thad H. Westbrook & Sarah Nielsen, Litigation Im-
plications of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act, BUS. L. TODAY 1 (2010), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2010/09/ 
litigation-implications-dodd-frank-201009.pdf. 
 326. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 327. Alan Rappeport, Mick Mulvaney, Consumer Bureau’s Chief, Urges Con-
gress to Cripple Agency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/04/02/us/politics/cfpb-mick-mulvaney.html; cf. Minority Staff Report, su-
pra note 155, at 5 (“Mr. Mulvaney has repeatedly claimed that he will hew 
closely to the law . . . .”). 
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Yet Mr. Mulvaney himself was willing to disregard congressional 
statutes and intent when observing them would impede his pol-
icy objectives. 
Rule of law concerns set in on day one, when Mr. Mulvaney 
assumed leadership of the Bureau. His decision to stay on as 
OMB Director while running the CFPB called into question at 
least four Dodd-Frank requirements, including the one creating 
the Bureau as an independent agency and those prohibiting 
OMB from overseeing CFPB affairs or operations, from review-
ing or approving CFPB legislative recommendations and testi-
mony, and from approving CFPB financial plans or quarterly re-
ports.328 In addition, his actions, as simultaneous head of OMB 
and the CFPB, in giving final approval to CFPB rulemaking de-
cisions raised questions about adherence with the spirit and the 
letter of E.O. 12,866.329  
Mr. Mulvaney’s rulemaking actions resulted in additional 
legal incursions. He disregarded the APA by refusing to imple-
ment final new rules promulgated under Mr. Cordray, earning 
the disapproval of one federal court.330 Similarly, he lifted an im-
portant new provision of the new HMDA rule without affording 
opportunity for public comment.331 
Mr. Mulvaney did not restrict his contempt for law to the 
rulemaking process. He contemplated transferring the CFPB’s 
supervisory authority over large depository institutions to the 
federal prudential banking regulators, in violation of the Dodd-
Frank Act.332 He stripped OFLEO of supervisory and enforce-
ment powers, overriding another provision of Dodd-Frank.333 
And he caved in to White House and executive branch pressure 
regarding enforcement in the Navient student loan and Wells 
Fargo cases.334 
 
 328. See supra notes 81–84 and 159–69 and accompanying text. These issues 
and those involving Executive Order 12,866 were briefed and argued to the D.C. 
Circuit in English v. Trump. See Brief for Consumer Financial Regulation 
Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant Leandra English at 7, 
11–13, 23–28, English v. Trump, No. 18-5007 (D.C. Cir. 2018), https://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3119202. Ms. English withdrew her ap-
peal before the court issued a ruling. See English v. Trump, No. 18-5007 (D.C. 
Cir. Jul. 13, 2018), appeal dismissed (per curiam). 
 329. See supra notes 81–84 and 166–69 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 190–92 and 196 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra notes 224–27 and 263–64 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra notes 170–72, 244–45, 250–51, and 266 and accompanying 
text. 
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A structure is only as strong as the laws that create it. Mr. 
Mulvaney’s attack on the CFPB’s functions through disregard 
for law was the most serious threat of all to the structure of the 
Bureau.  
 
